Do Enfranchised Immigrants Affect Politicians' Behavior?

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Abstract

This paper examines the political ramifications of immigrants' enfranchisement in the United Kingdom, a unique context, wherein immigrants from Ireland and the Commonwealth enjoy immediate voting rights upon arrival in all elections, while other immigrants are not similarly privileged. Using a shift-share design, I instrument immigrants' location based on prior settlement patterns. Drawing on text analysis of parliamentary speeches and voting patterns on immigration bills spanning 1972 to 2011, my findings reveal that members of Parliament (MPs) with heightened exposure to enfranchised immigrants are more vocal in Parliament about issues affecting immigrants positively. However, these MPs concurrently support stricter immigration curbs. The findings suggest a nuanced response: while enfranchisement amplifies immigrants' political engagement, it drives politicians to counteract the political costs by curbing future immigration, possibly to appease natives.

1 Introduction

The growing immigrant population in developed countries presents a complex landscape: while immigrants contribute to economic activity and add to cultural diversity, they also stir social and political tensions.[1] A less explored aspect of this demographic shift is the enfranchisement of immigrants or the lack thereof, a topic that has been recently gaining attention.[2] The inability of immigrants to vote results in their concerns being marginalized by politicians and provides fertile ground for xenophobic rhetoric. Meanwhile, naturalization—a potential gateway to integration (Hainmueller et al., 2017; Gathmann and Keller, 2018; Gathmann and Garbers, 2023)—remains a long and challenging process.[3] Adding complexity to the issue is the native population's hesitancy to extend voting privileges before naturalization to immigrants. Such reluctance often stems from fears of losing political leverage and further compounds resistance to new immigration.

This paper explores the central question: how does the enfranchisement of immigrants recalibrate politicians' stances in host countries? Politicians face a tough choice. On the one hand, addressing the needs of enfranchised immigrants might offer certain electoral gains given their distinct preferences. On the other, adopting pro-immigration stances may backfire, with the potential escalation of native hostility toward immigrants and a surge in populist sentiment (Barone et al., 2016; Halla et al., 2017; Dustmann et al., 2019; Edo et al., 2019). Further, the existing literature on politicians' responsiveness to voters' concerns finds instances of out-group prejudice juxtaposed with in-group favoritism (Butler and Broockman, 2011; Iyer et al., 2012; Butler, 2014). It remains unclear whether the enfranchisement of immigrants influences the political tenor of host countries.

The United Kingdom (UK) provides a unique context to answer this question. Unlike other nations that welcome immigrants, the UK grants immediate voting rights in all elections to those originating from Ireland and the Commonwealth—a set of nations historically intertwined with the British Empire—referred to as the enfranchised group. In contrast, migrants from nations outside this bracket must await UK citizenship before exercising similar democratic privileges (henceforth "disenfranchised"). I exploit within- and across-constituency variation in immigration from enfranchised and disenfranchised countries. To overcome the endogeneity in the location of immigrants, I use a shift-share instrumental variable (IV) approach, in which historical settlement across constituencies interacts with the overall migration inflow by the country (Card, 2009; Tabellini, 2020). The underpinning rationale remains that immigrants are inclined toward geographical clustering in their new homeland, with newcomers naturally gravitating toward areas that are densely populated by their ethnic counterparts.

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[1] See, Dustmann et al. (2005), Card et al. (2012), Halla et al. (2017), Sequeira et al. (2020), Bazzi et al. (2023) and Calderon et al. (2023), among others.

[2] In the United States, noncitizen voting rights at the local/municipal elections exist in Vermont, Washington, DC, and Maryland, and they are under consideration in New York, Illinois, Maine, and Massachusetts (Ashford, 2022). Similar policies are also under discussion in Sweden and Switzerland.

[3] In September 2021, the US government processed immigrant applications for Mexican family-based visas filed in February 1999 and employment-based visas for skilled workers from India filed in January 2014 (Visa Bulletin, Number 57, Volume X, US Department of State).

I analyze the incumbent's response to immigration using data on the universe of UK Parliament speeches and voting behavior on immigration bills between 1972 and 2011. These rich textual data aid in teasing incumbent sentiments with higher granularity. To find parliamentary speeches about immigrants, I use a dictionary-based approach. Quantitatively, I compute the fraction of parliamentary days per year where each member of Parliament (MP) talked about immigrants. Qualitatively, I estimate the sentiment score of those speeches using the valence norms associated with the speech text, where higher scores indicate positive sentiment. Last, I compute an average probability that an MP voted in favor of and against immigrants in amendments to the immigration bills tabled in Parliament.

I next investigate how the political discourse and voting patterns are influenced by the demographic changes caused by both enfranchised and disenfranchised immigrants within a constituency. I measure immigration as the changes in the fraction of foreign-born individuals over the constituency population. The foreign-born population is bifurcated into the enfranchised and disenfranchised groups, with the UK-born population identified as natives. The UK Parliament meets for about 155 days a year. On average, an MP talks about immigrants on 7.8 percent of parliament days (12 days). The average share of the foreign-born population is 8.8 percent, with 4.8 percent enfranchised and 4 percent disenfranchised.[4]

First, I analyze the effect on speeches. I find that a 1 standard deviation increase in the enfranchised immigration share of the population (equivalent to 5 percentage points) leads to a 1.4 percentage point increase in the share of parliamentary days on which MPs mention immigrants (an 18 percent, or a two-day, increase). The MPs also talk about immigrants positively: the valence norms increase by 0.22 standard deviations. The amplified speeches attributable to enfranchised immigration predominantly stem from the increased use of terms pertinent to immigrants from the enfranchised countries. In contrast, a 1 standard deviation increase in the disenfranchised immigration share leads to a 2.3 percentage point reduction in the share of parliament days on which MPs talk about immigrant issues. However, the sentiment is less positive: the valence norms decrease by 0.22 standard deviations.

Second, I analyze voting on bills. I find that a 1 standard deviation increase in enfranchised immigration leads to MPs being 12.3 percentage points more likely to vote for amending a bill against immigration (27 percent higher probability on a mean of 0.459). Additionally, they are 9.5 percentage points less likely to vote for amending a bill in favor of immigration. I find the opposite results for the MPs exposed to disenfranchised immigration.

I carry out several robustness checks to alleviate concerns about the identification strategy and threats to the exclusion restriction. I do not find differential pre-trends, and the two-state least squares (2SLS) results are robust to excluding ethnically close enfranchised immigrants (from Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and Ireland) and including controls for party vote shares, stock of immigrants, observable characteristics of immigrants, and the constituencies where MPs with ethnic-minority background contest. The data on parliamentary speeches are robust to excluding words related to future migrants. The results are robust to alternative versions of the estimation strategy, an alternative construction of the IVs, lagged immigration flows, and trends in baseline population shares, economic activity, and political conditions. In addition, I

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[4] Immigrants from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh comprise 34 percent of the enfranchised group. European immigrants to the UK constitute 46 percent of the disenfranchised group. Source: Author's calculations using censuses 1981, 1991, 2001, and 2011.

recover the effect of immigration shocks on outcomes through shift exposure as suggested by Borusyak et al. (2022).

I explain the opposite results in speeches and voting using politicians' electoral benefits and costs and immigrants' political engagement. An evaluation of data from the European Social Survey shows that enfranchised and disenfranchised immigrants share similarities in demographic and socioeconomic attributes. The historical connections do not make enfranchised immigrants more politically informed or trust UK institutions, and disenfranchised immigrants reported no feelings of discrimination stemming from voting restrictions. The political inclusion of immigrants makes MPs directly accountable for their representation. While addressing immigrant voters' concerns can fortify politicians' reputations, they face potential electoral repercussions from natives' hostility, a sentiment reflected in data from the European Social Survey and studies like (Grossman and Zonszein, 2021, 2022). In the UK context, Blinder and Allen (2016) find that natives' preference to reduce immigration goes as far back as the 1970s, and concerns are similar for both EU and non-EU immigration.

Analyzing the political attitude questions from the survey, I find that enfranchised immigrants display a 13.6 percent higher likelihood of sociopolitical participation than their disenfranchised counterparts. This divergence is not explained by English proficiency and is most pronounced among immigrants from robust democracies and those without UK citizenship. Meanwhile, these enfranchised immigrants also exhibit consistent election participation. Examining the electoral cost argument, I find that as MPs catered to immigrant interests, a section of natives gravitated toward alternate parties. Over time, constituencies with enfranchised immigration saw a decrease in vote shares for the Labour Party and an increase in vote shares for the other parties, particularly the Green Party and right-wing populist parties, without broad changes in political representation.

However, incumbents tread cautiously. Parliament discussions about immigrants decline in competitive constituencies and are higher in areas with a stronger Labour Party vote share. Incumbents, facing mounting electoral pressures, vote to curb future immigration and align with broader native preferences. Three findings support this. First, using survey data, I find that both types of immigrants are more open to future immigration than natives, even when they have UK citizenship. Second, the incumbents in tightly contested constituencies are more likely to vote to restrict future immigration. Third, incumbents in constituencies with a higher Labour Party vote share are more likely to amend the immigration bill to increase restrictions.

In the case of disenfranchised immigrants, there are no electoral benefits, and the natives' hostility could explain their negative representation. In contrast, for the enfranchised immigrants, the electoral benefits and higher political engagement explain their positive representation in Parliament. An in-depth analysis of parliamentary speeches reveals that enfranchised immigration leads to a 30 percent increase in the share of parliament days on which incumbents have mentioned immigrants in petitions, private member bills, and questions to ministers. The parliament discussions are higher in constituencies with enfranchised immigration from stronger democracies, solidifying the role of political engagement in shaping narratives. However, voting patterns on immigration bills mirror native sentiments and do not vary across enfranchised immigration from strong or weak democracies.

My research resonates with the burgeoning literature on the political economy of immigrants examining the integration of migrants and its effect on the political landscape, particularly on the surge in populist

sentiments (Abramitzky et al., 2012, 2014; Halla et al., 2017; Alabrese et al., 2019; Ricca and Trebbi, 2022). These works largely pivot on the premise that immigrants lack voting rights, with native reactions spurred by perceived cultural and economic threats. Distinctively, I illuminate how enfranchised immigrants mold politicians' stances and immigration policies in the host nation. A parallel narrative is shaped by Biavaschi and Facchini (2020), who exploit variation across US states regarding ballot access for foreign-born populations during the early 20th century. Their findings reveal that a more open migration policy garners support in contexts with significant numbers of naturalized US citizens, while this effect is inverted when enfranchisement is curtailed. My paper studies immigration in the contemporary UK, where the enfranchised immigrant population is small, the enfranchisement is independent of naturalization, and curbs on immigration primarily cater to native preferences.

Next, my work offers a fresh perspective on the enfranchisement literature. Seminal works by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), and Conley and Temimi (2001) postulate that elites expanded voting rights as a countermeasure to threats of revolution and social upheaval. However, the immigrant dynamics in my study differ from the disenfranchised native populations of the early 20th century. The influx rate of immigrants surpasses native population growth, generating demands for representative inclusion and amplifying native hostility. In this setting, curbing immigration becomes a strategy to consolidate power among the native majority and incumbent leaders, aligning with the interest convergence theory by Bell (1980). Moreover, a nascent literature on noncitizen enfranchisement in Europe (Ferwerda et al., 2020; Stutzer and Slotwinski, 2020; Koukal et al., 2021) probes native inclinations to grant voting rights to noncitizens. The UK emerges as an intriguing case study given that the enfranchisement decision was independent of the prevalent economic, political, and immigrant demographics.

Further, recent work analyzing political speeches has found that emotional rhetoric matters in the legislative arena (Osnabrügge et al., 2021; Ash et al., 2021; Card et al., 2022). For the British Parliament, the past literature predominantly spotlighted 19th- and 20th-century speeches (Eggers and Spirling, 2014; Spirling, 2016; Figueroa and Fouka, 2022; Hanlon, 2023). In contrast, I study how changes in population demographics due to immigration affect how politicians represent their constituents in the contemporary period. Last, existing research on politicians' responsiveness to voters has mainly focused on one-time field experimental audit studies (Butler and Broockman, 2011; Iyer et al., 2012; Broockman, 2013; Nye et al., 2015; Gell-Redman et al., 2018) and find that legislators respond to those constituents with whom they share personal characteristics such as race and ethnicity. My paper analyzes legislator responsiveness in a nonexperimental, repeated interaction setting over three decades. I find that incumbents respond to even those constituents with whom they do not share their race and ethnicity.

2 Conceptual Framework

In this section, I unpack the microfoundations of the incumbent's stance toward enfranchised and disenfranchised immigrants. Subsequent sections will test its empirical validity.

A segment of the native population perceives all immigrants as threats, both economically and culturally. Addressing immigrant issues might escalate electoral costs, especially with the emergence of populist parties, as noted by Barone et al. (2016), Halla et al. (2017), Dustmann et al. (2019), and Edo et al. (2019). This hostility is hypothesized to intensify with a rising immigrant count. Since addressing disenfranchised immigrants yields no direct electoral advantage, incumbents typically disregard their concerns. As the disenfranchised grow, the costs rise but benefits remain negligible and uncertain. Thus, the incumbents become increasingly adverse to rising numbers of disenfranchised immigrants.

Contrarily, addressing enfranchised immigrants can be electorally fruitful. However, incumbents risk alienating natives. The logic follows: it is beneficial to engage enfranchised immigrants if the benefits exceed the costs. With an enlarging enfranchised group, both the benefits and risks grow. For incumbents eyeing reelection, the challenge is to balance native and immigrant voter bases. Strategies might involve focusing on shared issues or minimizing native vote loss. One method might be curtailing future immigration—this might not align with immigrant views but could temper majority native antagonism. Thus, incumbents may respond to existing enfranchised immigrants positively as their population grows and simultaneously seek to restrict future immigration. Last, the electoral dynamics also hinge on the prevalent ideological climate. Some constituencies' pro-immigration ideologies could bolster certain parties, while others might experience a divide.

3 Context: Enfranchisement in the UK

Uniquely, the UK permits certain noncitizens to vote in national elections, a distinction most nations reserve strictly for their citizenry. Notably, some nations have extended voting privileges to noncitizens yet often under tight conditions, either through supranational group agreements or bilateral pacts.[5] However, the UK's system is distinct in its enfranchisement of Irish and Commonwealth residents, allowing them voting rights across all governmental tiers immediately upon arrival.

Historically, the foreign-born noncitizen enfranchisement was not a consequence of their significant presence in the UK during the early 20th century. The expansion of voting rights in the 19th and early 20th centuries evolved from a limited group of property-owning men to all British Empire residents in Britain, culminating in the Representation of the People Act of 1928. Concurrently, 1921 saw Ireland become a self-governing dominion within the British fold. A mere five years later in 1926, the Commonwealth of Nations emerged as a voluntary political coalition, with its members pledging allegiance to the Crown and acknowledging each other's equal stature (Balfour Declaration, approved at the Imperial Conference of 1926).

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[5] For instance, the European Union, a supranational group, often has multinational agreements allowing for some degree of voting rights reciprocity among member nations.

Over subsequent decades, most countries achieved independence from Britain, establishing their citizenship norms. However, UK-residing individuals from Ireland and the Commonwealth preserved their UK voting rights. In contrast, non-Commonwealth and non-Irish residents can only vote in all UK elections upon attaining UK citizenship. Intriguingly, the Commonwealth's membership has been dynamic, with countries such as Pakistan, South Africa, Gambia, and the Maldives exiting and later reentering. Meanwhile, nations without historical ties to the British Empire, such as Cameroon, Rwanda, and Mozambique, have joined the Commonwealth and consequently gained voting rights in the UK. Broadly, changes in membership to the Commonwealth do not affect the voting rights of its residents in the UK.[6]

Figure 1: Enfranchised Countries

Notes: The map showcases countries whose residents have voting rights in the UK during my study period, based on Commonwealth membership. A complete country list is in Appendix Table A1. *Data Source:* https://www.gov.uk/register-to-vote and https://thecommonwealth.org/.

Figure 1 shows a world map of the countries, highlighting those whose UK-resident population can vote upon arrival. This enfranchised group exhibits vast diversity, encompassing both developed and developing nations. The Commonwealth currently boasts 54 member nations. The major immigrant-sending countries by region are the Pacific (Australia and New Zealand), Europe (Ireland, Cyprus, and Malta), the Caribbean and Americas (Canada, Bahamas, Dominica, Jamaica, and Barbados), Asia (Bangladesh, India,

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[6] Source: https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/running-electoral-registration-england/eligibility-register-vote/what-are-nationality-requirements-register-vote/can-a-commonwealth-citizen-register-vote.

Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore, and Sri Lanka), and Africa (Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, and South Africa). A comprehensive listing of enfranchised nations, organized regionally, is available in Appendix Table A1.

General elections in the UK are theoretically scheduled every five years on the first Thursday of May, using the first-past-the-post voting system. In this system, voters from 650 single-member parliamentary constituencies select their preferred MP, usually from the two predominant parties: the Labour Party and the Conservative Party. Throughout its history, while the UK Parliament has frequently revised its immigration and nationality laws, voting rights for Commonwealth citizens remain unaltered. Notably, a 2008 report by Lord Goldsmith reviewed British citizenship laws and recommended limiting the right to vote in Westminster elections to UK citizens only. The report proposed to rectify the voting rights for noncitizens by phasing out the right of Commonwealth citizens to vote in general elections and confining the voting rights to citizens of those (few) countries that offer reciprocal rights. Despite this, the issue remains untouched, perhaps due to the reluctance of incumbents to alienate a segment of the noncitizen voters.

4 Data

4.1 Census Data

I extract data on foreign-born individuals from the 1981, 1991, 2001, and 2011 censuses, starting with the 1981 Census because it is the first occasion where disaggregated data on foreign-born individuals at the parliamentary constituency level are publicly accessible. Due to the lack of disaggregated data for Scotland and Northern Ireland at the constituency level, all census data-centric analyses presented in this paper focus exclusively on England and Wales, which constitute approximately 89 percent of the UK's population.

The 1981 Census demarcates the foreign-born population into nine categories, consisting of seven subgroups for the enfranchised population: the old Commonwealth (Australia, New Zealand, Canada), East Africa and Other Africa, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Caribbean, and New Other (Cyprus and Far Eastern Colonies). In contrast, the disenfranchised population encompasses Europe and the rest of the world. In subsequent censuses of 1991, 2001, and 2011, there was an increase in the number of subdivisions of the foreign-born population compared to the 1981 Census. A comprehensive mapping of individual country groups throughout these census years is provided in Appendix Table A2. In this paper, the term "immigrants" refers to the foreign-born population.

While county borders have largely persisted during the study's time frame, the Boundary Commission adjusted intracounty parliamentary constituency boundaries in 1974, 1983, 1997, and 2010. To achieve temporal comparability, I use publicly available data to align the parliamentary constituencies with their parent units, conducting my analysis on these unaltered constituency units. The parliamentary constituencies in England and Wales went from 570 to 192 upon adjusting for consistency. Given the disparity in the count of constituencies amalgamated to constitute a consistent unit, I construct all the variables as a weighted average by the constituency's electorate size.

Two illustrative examples elucidate the method used to devise stable constituency units. In Warwickshire County's context (example 1), boundary revisions necessitated the treatment of the entire county as a singular unit. Table A3 provides the chronology of each constituency's inception and termination, along with its predecessor and successor constituencies. Figure A1 visually represents these boundary alterations. For

Somerset County (example 2), despite boundary adjustments, three primary units were discernible among the seven constituencies observed over this period. Boundary shifts are visually represented in Figure A2, with Table A4 elaborating on the specifics of the changes induced by the delimitation commission in 1983 and 2010.

4.2 European Social Survey

Drawn from 28 European nations, the European Social Survey offers a repeated cross-sectional, individual-level perspective on socioeconomic and political values. Between 2002 and 2018, nine biannual survey cycles were executed. The survey's distinct advantage over other data sets lies in its comprehensive documentation of respondents' country of birth, enabling the precise identification of immigrants from the two groups. For this study's purpose, I harness the UK-specific segment of the survey, centering my analysis on respondents born outside the UK.

4.3 Hansard Parliament Speeches

The UK Parliament furnishes the entirety of individual legislative discourse verbatim through Hansard.[7] I web scraped Hansard for the years spanning 1972 to 2011 from the House of Commons, the elected legislative chamber. These data amalgamate proceedings of the House of Commons, written ministerial statements, petitions, divisions, and proceedings from both the Commons General Committees and the Public Bill Committees.

For each parliament sitting (day), Hansard catalogs the MP's name, the speech's full text, and the broad topic and the subtopic. A single parliamentary day typically unfolds as a series of deliberations on various topics by MPs. I define a parliament speech as the complete speech text for each MP within each broad topic and subtopic on a given parliament day. A representative structure for discerning individual speeches amid these deliberations can be seen in Table A5, with Table A7 offering illustrative excerpts from Hansard's recorded speeches. Some speeches have a broad topic and a subtopic, while others have a broad topic. Aggregated, the data set encompasses text from 7,436 parliamentary days, totaling around three million distinct speeches.

I match the MP's name to their parliamentary constituency using information from TheyWorkForYou,[8] and I map the parliament days to the parliament sessions (via the general election cycle). Overall, I can match 95 percent of the parliament speeches to a constituency. Discrepancies in achieving a full match often arose from ambiguities in common speaker names (e.g., Mr. Smith) to a unique constituency. Within the subsample of data relevant to my analysis (i.e., the speeches about immigrants), the match rate is 97 percent.

4.4 Construction of the Outcome Variables

To understand how MPs talk about immigrants in Parliament, I curate a subset of relevant speeches using a dictionary-based methodology, that is, using words commonly used in the literature to extract speeches about immigrants and constituency (Saalfeld, 2011; Geese et al., 2015; Slapin et al., 2018; Slapin and Kirkland, 2020). Key terms, in essence, encompass the following: immigra*, migra*, foreigner*, asylum*, refugee*,

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[7] https://hansard.parliament.uk.
[8] https://www.theyworkforyou.com/.

and minorit*. These lexemes filter out parliamentary speeches mentioning immigrants. To distill a granular measure of individual MP speeches tailored to their constituencies, I specifically harness those speeches combining terminologies of both immigrants and constituencies.[9] Next, I compute three types of outcome variables for each constituency unit and year.

First, I calculate a quantitative measure of speeches. This metric assesses the proportion of yearly parliament days where an MP spoke about immigrants. I call this outcome variable *Discussions*. One might also think of other quantitative measures such as the volume of the parliament speeches or simply the count of speeches per parliament day or per speech day about immigrants. Owing to the restrictive time frame that MPs possess to vocalize their stances, I focus on the share of speeches about immigrants per year.

Second, I compute the qualitative measures of speeches via sentiment analysis. This measure is conditional on MPs speaking about immigrants. I harness the valence norms advanced by Warriner et al. (2013), a compendium offering valence scores for roughly 14,000 words, graded on a 1–9 scale. The valence score tells us the pleasant emotion conveyed by a word, with higher numbers indicating more positive sentiment. I start by removing the punctuation and converting all the text to lowercase. A subsequent lemmatization phase, aided by the Natural Language Toolkit's WordNet Lemmatizer (Bird et al., 2009), optimally distills words to their rudimentary forms. Finally, I compute the valence score by taking the mean valence rating of all words in individual speech.

Third, I calculate an average probability of voting on all bills in a given census year. I follow DEMIG (2015) to obtain a list of all acts proposed in the UK Parliament related to immigration during my time period of study.[10] The voting on amendments to the bills could be pro- or anti-immigration, depending on the current draft of the bill. I classify the proposed amendment to the bill either in favor (pro-immigrants) or against (anti-immigrants) by hand coding the speech of the MP who started the amendment. I capture the names of MPs who voted in favor ("ayes") or against ("noes") those amendments, where ayes would imply voting to amend and noes implies voting to maintain the status quo on the bill. Thus, I measure two outcome variables: amendments in favor and against immigrants on bills tabled in Parliament.

I then analyze the electoral outcomes between the 1970 and 2010 general elections using the election results from the Commons Library research briefings.[11] The data set includes party-wise vote distribution, turnout, and electorate size for each constituency. I redefine these variables for the 192 parent constituency units using a weighted average by the electorate size of the constituencies. Table A6 provides a mapping of general election dates to census years. There have been 11 general elections in the UK during my study period, all scheduled in the five-year interval.

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[9] For an exhaustive lexicon, refer to Appendix Table A8, which clusters terms under overarching themes: immigrants, visa and nationality, enfranchised nations, disenfranchised nations, refugees, and constituency.

[10] Table A9 annotates these bills, summarizing them and pinpointing target demographics.

[11] Source: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8647/.

5   Empirical Framework

5.1   Main Estimation Equation

My research question is, Does enfranchised immigration affect MPs' speeches and voting related to immigration bills? I employ a constituency-level difference model to answer this question due to the slow changes in my outcome variables over time (Appendix Figure A3) and the six-year waiting period for immigrants to apply for citizenship. My outcome variables are parliament debates and voting (details on the construction are available in Section 4.4). My explanatory variables are enfranchised and disenfranchised immigration. I measure immigration (migration flow) in census year t as a change in the stock of foreign-born population between the census years t and $t-10$. Immigration is calculated separately for the foreign-born population from enfranchised and disenfranchised countries.

I regress the change in the outcome in constituency c between years t and $t-10$ ($Y_{crt} - Y_{crt-10}$), on the change in the share of the foreign-born enfranchised population (Imm_{crt}^{Enf}) and the foreign-born disenfranchised population ($\text{Imm}_{crt}^{DisEnf}$) between the census years. The immigration between census year t and $t-10$ is mapped to the outcome variables between years t and $t-9$. Since the constituency population could be an outcome of immigration, the number of immigrants from each group is scaled by the baseline constituency population (1981 Census).

$$\Delta Y_{crt} = \beta_1 \text{Imm}_{crt}^{Enf} + \beta_2 \text{Imm}_{crt}^{DisEnf} + \gamma' X_{crt} + \delta_r + \delta_t + \Delta \epsilon_{crt}, \tag{1}$$

where δ_t represent period fixed effects to account for time-specific characteristics that are similar across constituencies and affect the outcome variable, for example, election years. δ_r represents the region fixed effects controlling for regional time trends in a levels specification.[12] Since I am estimating long differences, my specification implicitly accounts for constituency fixed effects and eliminates any time-constant constituency-specific characteristics that may affect the outcome variables and the immigrant allocation in the same way. X_{crt} controls for differential trends across municipalities with different initial constituency characteristics (see Section 5.3 for a discussion of these variables). The coefficient of interest, β_1, estimates the effect of changes in the fraction of enfranchised immigrants within a constituency over time. This is compared to other constituencies within the same region in a given year, while controlling for changes in the fraction of disenfranchised immigrants. I cluster standard errors at the constituency level.

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[12] England and Wales are divided into 10 regions. A region contain 19 constituencies, on average.

Consistency of β_1 requires that immigration from the enfranchised group (Imm_{crt}^{Enf}) and the disenfranchised group ($\text{Imm}_{crt}^{DisEnf}$) is strictly exogenous in Equation (1); that is, $\text{E}(\Delta\epsilon_{crt}|\text{Imm}_{crt}^{Enf}) = 0$ and $\text{E}(\Delta\epsilon_{crt}|\text{Imm}_{crt}^{DisEnf}) = 0$. A priori, constituencies with MPs more liberal on immigration (enfranchised, disenfranchised, or both) might attract more immigrants, which could bias the coefficient upwards. The reverse can also be true; an influx of immigrants might lead to political movements that influence how MPs speak and vote, and MPs might take a harder stance on immigration, biasing the coefficients downwards. In any case, the endogeneity of Imm_{crt}^{Enf} and $\text{Imm}_{crt}^{DisEnf}$ as well as omitted variables will likely make ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of Equation (1) biased.

5.2 Leave-Out Shift-Share Instrument

To address the endogeneity issue, I construct a modified version of the Bartik instrument (Card, 2001), in which the shifts are assumed to be exogenous (Borusyak, Hull, and Jaravel, 2022). The instrument combines immigrant shares of the different groups in 1981 with subsequent aggregate shocks of immigrants, excluding individuals that eventually settled in a given constituency. Formally, Imm_{crt}^{k}, where $k \in \{Enf, DisEnf\}$ is instrumented with

$$Z_{crt}^{k} = \frac{1}{P_{crt}} \sum_j \alpha_{jc} O_{jt}^{-c}, \tag{2}$$

where P_{crt} is the baseline constituency population (where $t = 1981$) and α_{jc} is the share of individuals from country group j (for each k) living in constituency c in 1981. O_{jt}^{-c} is the number of immigrants from country group j who entered the UK between census years t and $t - 10$, net of those who eventually settled in the constituency.

I use this leave-out strategy so that local area changes do not contaminate the instrument (similar to Burchardi, Chaney, and Hassan (2019) and Tabellini (2020)). As a robustness check, I also estimate the leave-out instrument at the county level to eliminate any concerns about immigrant pull factors that might be correlated across constituencies within a county.[13] The instrument exploits time-series variation in immigrants entering the UK from the two groups in a given decade and a cross-sectional variation in the share of immigrants from country group j living in different constituencies in 1981.

Figure 2 shows the spatial variation (across- and within-constituency) in the share of the foreign-born population and the share of the enfranchised foreign-born population across the 192 constituencies using the 1981 Census. Panel (a) plots the share of the foreign-born population over the total population, divided across quartiles. The London, Birmingham, and Oxford areas have the highest proportion of this population, while constituencies farthest away from these areas have the lowest. Panel (b) plots the share of the enfranchised foreign-born population over the total foreign-born population across quartiles. A given constituency may

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[13] The 192 parliamentary constituencies of England and Wales are divided into 43 counties.

have a large fraction of the foreign-born population and a large part of that fraction might be enfranchised. Simultaneously, a constituency might have a small proportion of the enfranchised foreign-born population.

5.3 Identification Assumptions

Since most new immigrants tend to settle in places where existing immigrants live, the endogenous variables and the shift-share instrument are directly correlated. Next, the instrument and the error term should not be correlated conditional on the observable covariates. That is, the constituencies that received more immigrants before 1981 must not be on different trajectories of the evolution of economic and political conditions in the subsequent decades. I test the validity of these two identifying assumptions in the following section.

First, I examine if larger immigrant stocks before 1981 had an independent and time-varying effect on the political or economic conditions in the future periods. I control for the 1981 population shares of the different country groups in my main specification to account for linear trends in the initial distribution of immigrants. The aim is to test if specific immigrant groups (e.g., from India or Bangladesh) were more likely to settle in particular areas to influence the local political and economic conditions by holding the differences within the immigrant-sending country group constant.

Second, there may also be concerns about the exclusion restriction. For example, immigration affects local political movements, such as the rise of a populist party or ethnic-minority candidates contest in the elections. These movements can affect the speeches and votes of MPs. To control for this, I include time-varying economic characteristics of the immigrants, vote shares of parties, a dummy if MPs with an ethnic-minority background contest in the elections, and immigrant stocks as additional controls.

Third, Jaeger, Ruist, and Stuhler (2018) suggests that the instruments might be vulnerable to bias from the dynamic adjustments to past shocks. I include lagged immigrant inflows in the model and instrument with a lagged version of the instrument. This isolates the variation in inflows uncorrelated with current local demand shocks and the adjustment to past supply shocks. Additionally, I test if the initial economic conditions had a time-varying effect on the economic conditions across constituencies by augmenting my baseline specification with the 1981 economic characteristics, such as the share of the economically active population, the fraction of employment by industry (agriculture, manufacturing, construction, etc.), and pre-period population shares.

Fourth, in my context, I allow the initial population shares of the country groups to be endogenously distributed, and the identification follows from the quasi-random assignment of shocks. One may worry that shocks are not randomly assigned. To alleviate this concern, I carry out a placebo regression where I directly test if pre-period changes in the quantity and quality of discussions about immigrants are uncorrelated with subsequent immigration changes predicted by the instrument. In addition, following Borusyak, Hull, and Jaravel (2022), I show a similar inference using the transformed IV regression estimated at the level of shocks that has a numerical equivalence to the shift-share IV regression.

5.4 Individual Surveys

Using the European Social Survey, I analyze the differences between immigrants from the enfranchised and the disenfranchised groups. I estimate the following linear regression:

Figure 2: Distribution of Immigrants

Census 1981

Census 1981

(0.008, 0.03]	(0.03, 0.043]	(0.043, 0.07]	(0.07, 0.344]

(0.28, 0.55]	(0.55, 0.61]	(0.61, 0.71]	(0.71, 0.91]

(a) Share Foreign-Born

(b) Share Enfranchised Foreign-Born

(c) Share Immigrants over time

Notes: Panels (a) and (b) from the 1981 Census depict the quartile distribution of immigrants in England and Wales. Panel (a) represents the foreign-born percentage of the total population, while panel (b) shows the enfranchised foreign-born percentage of all foreign-born individuals. Panel (c) presents the shifts in the foreign-born ratio over the 1981, 1991, 2001, and 2011 censuses, segmented by enfranchised and disenfranchised groups using a box plot.

Data source: UK Census, 1981–2011.

$$Y_{irt} = \gamma I(\text{Enfranchised Immigrant})_i + \beta' X_{irt} + \delta_r + \delta_t + \epsilon_{irt}, \qquad (3)$$

where Y_{irt} is the outcome variable for individual i residing in region r surveyed in the survey round year t. The γ coefficient captures the average differences in the outcome variable for respondents between the two groups after accounting for individual controls (X_{irt} — education level, employment status, and life satisfaction) as well as region (δ_r) and time fixed effects (δ_t). I use post-stratification and population weights on my estimates to account for the sampling error and the nonresponse bias.

6   Results

6.1   Summary Statistics

Figure 2, panel (c) provides a visual representation of the proportion of enfranchised and disenfranchised foreign-born populations within constituencies over different census years. Displayed as a box plot, the interquartile range is shown by the box's span, and the median is denoted by the black line contained within. A salient observation from this figure is the absence of dominance by either the enfranchised (illustrated in orange) or the disenfranchised (depicted in blue) groups during any specific census period. By 1981, both categories of immigrants make up a modest 2 to 3 percent of the total population. This figure slightly increases by the 2011 Census, where the average of both groups is around 6 percent. Although a few outlier constituencies, represented in black dots, exhibit a large share of immigrants, they are few and display a balanced representation of both the enfranchised and disenfranchised groups.

Table 1 delves deeper, offering a numerical breakdown of the variables employed in the data analysis. A typical constituency housed an average of 274,000 individuals, with foreign-born citizens comprising roughly 8.8 percent of this number. When further segmented, the enfranchised and disenfranchised foreign-born populations accounted for an average of 4.8 percent and 4 percent, respectively. Between 1981 and 2011, the UK Parliament convened for an average of 155 days annually, with the number of days fluctuating between a minimum of 125 and a maximum of 178. MPs, on an average basis, spoke on 53 percent of these parliamentary days. Within these discussions, immigrant concerns featured on approximately 7.8 percent of the days. The sentiment scores, conditional on the issues being discussed, indicate that the mean sentiment score for immigrant-related speeches across constituencies in a particular year was 5.6. Voting patterns further reveal that 52 percent of MPs were inclined to support amendments beneficial to immigrants, whereas 46 percent voted against them in Parliament.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	Obs.
Total Population (in thousands)	274.32	241.43	52.71	1347.49	5760
Share of Foreign-Born	0.088	0.09	0.01	0.50	5760
Share of Enfranchised Foreign-Born	0.048	0.051	0.004	0.297	5760
Share of Disenfranchised Foreign-Born	0.040	0.042	0.003	0.317	5760
Total Parliament Days per year	154.50	13.95	125	178	5760
Share of Speech Days:					
... Total	0.53	0.30	0.00	1.00	5760
... Immigrants	0.078	0.08	0.00	0.66	5760
Speech Valence:					
... Immigrants	5.60	0.08	4.59	6.14	5406
Voting Pro-Immigration on Bills	0.52	0.40	0.00	1.00	5750
Voting Anti-Immigration on Bills	0.46	0.40	0.00	1.00	5630

Notes: The data encompasses a stable panel of 192 constituencies across 30 years. Constituencies are grouped by parent units to adjust for boundary changes. Valence scores and voting apply only when politicians speak about immigrants or attend parliament voting sessions.

Figure 3: First Stage: Partial Correlations

(a) Enfranchised Immigration   (b) Disenfranchised Immigration

Notes: The figure displays the link between immigrant fractions and the instrument, adjusting for controls and fixed effects. Panel (a) pertains to the enfranchised group, while Panel (b) covers the disenfranchised group. The F-statistic represents the Sanderson-Windmeijer partial F-stat derived from separate first-stage regressions. *Data Source:* The Census, $1981 - 2011$.

The F-statistics are presented at the bottom of all tables with 2SLS estimation. The Kleibergen-Paap F-stat, denoted as the KP F-stat, offers an assessment of weak instruments. Simultaneously, F-stat (Enf) and F-stat (DisEnf) represent the Sanderson-Windmeijer partial F-stats that gauge the joint significance of the

instruments in two distinct first-stage regressions. Figure 3 graphically depicts the first-stage regressions available in Appendix Table A11. The results from the first-stage suggest the instrument is strong and predictive of the immigrants' location.

Table 2: Effect of Enfranchisement on Parliament Speeches

	Δ Discussions			Δ Valence		
	(1) OLS	(2) 2SLS	(3) 2SLS	(4) OLS	(5) 2SLS	(6) 2SLS
Enfranchised Immigration	0.004 (0.003)	0.012** (0.006)	0.014** (0.006)	0.038 (0.033)	0.224*** (0.072)	0.217*** (0.070)
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.015** (0.006)	-0.023*** (0.008)	-0.053 (0.043)	-0.226** (0.089)	-0.225** (0.105)
Mean DV (in levels)	0.078	0.078	0.078			
KP F Stat		22.38	26.30		22.86	22.16
F Stat (Enf)		47.62	56.73		43.31	52.15
F Stat (DisEnf)		54.15	58.44		64.38	70.51
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls			Yes			Yes
Observations	5760	5760	5760	5091	5091	5091

Notes: This table showcases OLS (Columns 1, 4) and 2SLS (Columns 2, 3, 5, 6) estimates on the impact of enfranchisement on parliamentary speeches. Dependent variables capture quantitative (Columns 1-3) and qualitative (Columns 4-6) speech metrics on immigrants. Discussions represent the share of days politicians discuss immigrants, while Valence reflects sentiment scores, with higher values denoting positive sentiment. Immigration values are based on foreign-born populations from either enfranchised or disenfranchised countries relative to the baseline constituency and are instrumented via the shift-share method (detailed in Section 5.1). KP F stat refers to the Kleibergen-Paap F-stat for the joint significance of the two instruments in the first-stage regression. F-stat (Enf) and F-stat (DisEnf) indicate the Sanderson-Windmeijer partial F-stat for each instrument. Robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. *Data Source:* Text of Speech from the UK Parliament Hansard, $1972 - 2011$.

6.2 Effect on Parliament Speeches

Until recently, political preferences were gauged predominantly through party manifestos and voting records, as in Dinas and Gemenis (2010); Cage et al. (2021). The rich and nuanced articulation of views in parliamentary speeches offers an avenue less tainted by partisan influences than voting records. This research pivots to explore how the enfranchisement of immigrants affects parliamentary debates about them.

Table 2 shows the paper's main results. The OLS estimation of Equation (1) is captured in columns 1 and 4, while the 2SLS estimation is shown in columns 2, 3, 5, and 6. A discernible pattern emerges: OLS point estimates for the enfranchised group are consistently lower than their 2SLS counterparts. This hints at a negative selection effect, wherein enfranchised immigrants may engage more with the political system, affecting local policies and resource allocation in a way that benefits the community at large. The resultant

political speeches, shaped by the political participation of settlers, may perpetuate these effects over time, making the OLS underestimate the effects. In contrast, without political participation, the disenfranchised immigrants do not influence local politics, and the OLS estimates are higher than the 2SLS ones.

Quantitative Effects.   Columns 1, 2, and 3 present results on the outcome variable *Discussions*. On average, the MPs spoke about immigrants on 7.8 percent of parliament days. Column 1 (OLS) suggests that higher enfranchised immigration increases parliament discussions about immigrants, and the results are reversed for disenfranchised immigration, although both coefficients are insignificant. The 2SLS analysis in column 2 suggests a tangible impact: a 1 standard deviation increase in enfranchised immigration augments the proportion of parliamentary days centered on immigration by 1.2–1.4 percentage points (15 to 18 percent relative to the mean outcome variable in levels). These discussions appear tailored to a higher use of words for the enfranchised countries and not the disenfranchised countries (Appendix Table C3, column 4). Conversely, the discussions contract by 2.3 percentage points for a similar increment in disenfranchised immigration (column 3).

For context, it is illuminating to juxtapose these discussions with other parliamentary debates. In the UK Parliament, over one year, MPs on average dedicated 34 days (22.3 percent) to constituency concerns, 7 days (4.4 percent) to the National Health Service, and 12 days (8.1 percent) to taxes. The findings in Table 2, column 3 imply that a 5 percent increase in enfranchised immigrants translates to an additional 2.17 days of immigration-centric discussions. Overall, for a constituency that receives 5 percent more immigrants and in which 50 percent are enfranchised, there is a decrease in the frequency of mentions of immigrants in parliament debates by 1.4 days.

Qualitative Effects.   In columns 4, 5, and 6 the "Valence" measure provides standardized valence scores. There is a drop in the sample size because not all MPs spoke about immigrants in Parliament every year.[14] Column 4 (OLS) suggests that higher enfranchised immigration correlates with more positive speeches about immigrants, with an inverse relationship for disenfranchised immigration. However, both coefficients are not significant. The 2SLS analysis shows that a 1 standard deviation surge in enfranchised immigration increases the valence scores by 0.22 standard deviations; that is, the MPs talk more positively when they mention immigrants. I find that an increase in disenfranchised immigration leads to a fall in the valence scores by a similar magnitude; that is, incumbents spoke less positively over time.

In Table 2, columns 3 and 6, I augment the baseline specification with several control variables: party vote shares, the stock of immigrants, a dummy for constituencies where ethnic-minority candidates contest elections, and immigrants' observable characteristics (age, gender, marital status, employment, and educational levels).[15] If immigration impacts these variables, then some of the changes in the outcome variables might be mediated through them. Reassuringly, for enfranchised immigration, neither the economic nor the statistical significance of the coefficients are affected. Additionally, I find that dropping the enfranchised immigrants

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[14] Table A12 replicates Table 2 by replacing the missing valence scores with the last available score for each constituency. I find almost similar results, suggesting that missing data are not a significant concern.

[15] I compute the average values of these variables using individual data from the cohorts of immigrants who arrived during each census year from the British Household Panel Survey (1991–2008) and the UK Household Longitudinal Study (2009–2019). Details are provided in Appendix Section A.2.

who come from countries that are most ethnically close to natives (Ireland, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand) does not affect the results (Appendix Table A13).

Figure 4: Robustness of Results

Notes: This figure aggregates the point estimates from the various regression results discussed in the Appendix Section A.3. It serves as a visual summary of the robustness checks and alternative estimation strategies conducted to validate the main findings of the paper.

Robustness. Appendix Section A.3 examines various threats to identification and discusses multiple robustness checks. I summarize them in this paragraph and depict all the point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals in Figure 4.

The main results in Table 2 remain stable even when individual controls are introduced individually (Appendix Table C2). Appendix Table C3 shows the robustness of the results when certain categories of words used to identify speeches are excluded. Moreover, it confirms that the increase in parliamentary discussion is specific to immigrants from enfranchised countries. In Appendix Table C1, I test for various alternative versions of the estimation strategy, such as in levels rather than in long differences, estimating decadal changes rather than yearly changes, and using predicted population to construct the instrument as opposed to historical data from 1981. The findings show that the main results hold under various specifications, including when examining the effect of the share of enfranchised immigration (Appendix Table C4).

Appendix Table C5 presents the robustness of the IV strategy by constructing an alternative version of the instruments, such as a traditional Bartik instrument without the leave-out strategy and a leave-out version of the instrument at the county level to alleviate any concerns that pull factors are correlated across the constituency units. With new information from each census, I increase the number of country groups in the enfranchised and disenfranchised immigration groups and use new networks to predict immigration. This robustness alleviates any concerns that fewer country groups could be problematic and that immigrant

networks from the 1980s may not be a reliable forecast of immigrant settlements in subsequent years.

Appendix Table C6 reveals that including control variables like the 1981 share of employment across various industries does not significantly alter the results. Furthermore, accounting for specific baseline immigrant groups and initial political conditions does not impact the point estimates. In addition, considering the lagged immigrant flows, I find that current immigration is the main driver of the effects observed rather than historical migration patterns (Jaeger et al., 2018). A placebo regression confirms that the changes in immigration are not influencing the outcome variables, supporting the view that the shocks are randomly assigned. Last, I observe a similar inference using the shock-level transformation that has a numerical equivalence to the shift-share instrument as suggested by Borusyak et al. (2022).

Table 3: Effect on Party Vote Shares

	Δ Vote Share			
	Labour	Conservative	LibDem + Plaid Cymru	Populist + Green + Independent
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Enfranchised Immigration	-0.012**	0.003	0.003	0.006**
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.002)
Disenfranchised Immigration	0.011	-0.020***	0.008	0.001
	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.003)
Mean DV (in levels)	0.366	0.378	0.229	0.027
KP F Stat	21.23	21.23	21.23	21.23
F Stat (Enf)	52.48	52.48	52.48	52.48
F Stat (DisEnf)	44.56	44.56	44.56	44.56
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5760	5760	5760	5760

Notes: This table presents 2SLS estimates from a panel of 192 constituencies spanning 30 years, focusing on party vote shares. Columns 1-4 display vote shares for Labour, Conservative, regional, and other parties, respectively. Immigration values are based on foreign-born populations from either enfranchised or disenfranchised countries relative to the baseline constituency and are instrumented via the shift-share method (detailed in Section 5.1). KP F stat refers to the Kleibergen-Paap F-stat for the joint significance of the two instruments in the first-stage regression. F-stat (Enf) and F-stat (DisEnf) indicate the Sanderson-Windmeijer partial F-stat for each instrument. Robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. *Data Source:* Text of Speech from the UK Parliament Hansard, 1972 − 2011 and House of Commons Library Report on General Elections 1970 − 2010.

6.3 Effect on Political Landscape

In this subsection, I examine how the political discourse around immigration translates into electoral consequences for incumbents. The rise of anti-immigrant populist parties and their association with immigration has been previously documented (Halla et al., 2017; Dustmann et al., 2019; Guriev and Papaioannou, 2022). This subsection further probes into the electoral implications of these phenomena by

exploring the nexus between different immigrant groups and shifts in party vote shares. Table 3 provides a comprehensive analysis of these patterns. Here, I segment vote shares into four categories: the Labour Party (column 1), the Conservative Party (column 2), regional parties (specifically, the Liberal Democrats[16] and Plaid Cymru in column 3), and a conglomerate of other parties that encompasses populist groups, the Green Party, and independent contenders (column 4).[17]

The data reveal a nuanced narrative. Specifically, a surge in enfranchised immigration corresponds to an uptick in vote shares for other parties, primarily the populist and Green factions. This suggests a distinctive shift among natives in constituencies where incumbents projected a favorable stance on immigrants. Such natives displayed a propensity to migrate away from the Labour Party—a traditionally pro-immigration entity—to alternative political options. Conversely, in constituencies witnessing a rise in disenfranchised immigration, the narrative diverges. Incumbents in these areas already exhibited less positivity toward immigrants. Consequently, the data do not capture notable shifts in vote shares for the "other" parties cluster (column 4). Instead, there is a significant drop in the Conservative vote share and an increase in the Labour vote share.

To understand these dynamics holistically, it is pivotal to explore the backdrop against which these shifts transpired. Importantly, these alterations in party vote shares did not materialize due to natives' domestic migratory patterns between constituencies (Appendix Table A14, column 1). Furthermore, electoral participation remained relatively stable in these constituencies, albeit enfranchised immigration leads to a slight 1.4 percent decline in turnout, translating to a modest 0.009 percentage point dip (Table A14, column 2).[18] In Parliament, enfranchised immigration did not affect the share of seats across political parties (Table A14, columns 4–7). However, in areas with pronounced disenfranchised immigration, Conservative MPs conceded their seats predominantly to their Labour and regional party counterparts.

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[16] The party is a federation of the English, Scottish, and Welsh Liberal Democrats. The largest among them, the English Liberal Democrats, is a federation of 11 regional parties in England.

[17] The House of Commons Library reports votes shares for the Green Party and the UK Independence Party (UKIP) separately from the 2005 general election but combines votes shares for the UKIP, the Green Party, and independent candidates as other votes before the 2005 election. For consistency, I combine them across all years.

[18] While immigration could influence both local and national politics, I focus on MPs' actions because the local elections have a meager turnout of natives (around 25 to 30 percent). The European immigrants are enfranchised at the local elections, but their turnout is even lower than the enfranchised immigrants.

While the overarching party allegiance of constituencies remains unchanged, I probe further into the potential increase in the descriptive representation of ethnic-minority candidates. Since the descriptive representation will take some time,[19] I employ a modified version of Equation (1) to scrutinize variations in this descriptive representation over a 10-year horizon, contingent on preceding immigration trends. The empirical findings indicate that enfranchised immigration augments the likelihood of ethnic-minority candidates' representation in the subsequent decade (Appendix Table A15). Contrarily, the disenfranchised counterparts do not exert a similar influence. Reassuringly, I do not find the quantitative and qualitative effects on parliament speeches to be any different among those constituencies where ethnic-minority candidates did or did not contest (Table A16).

To encapsulate, the dynamics suggest a complex interplay. Incumbents, despite their favorability toward enfranchised immigrants, face an electoral conundrum. While natives gravitate toward alternative political options, the core political landscape—reflected by the party affiliations of MPs—remains unchanged. This stability suggests that incumbents might be recalibrating their strategies, aligning policies that resonate with both natives and immigrants, or potentially mitigating anti-immigrant sentiments among the electorate. This strategic positioning mirrors findings from Feigenbaum and Hall (2015), where US legislators adeptly navigated economic dislocations from Chinese imports, ensuring that such perturbations did not jeopardize their reelection prospects. To further deconstruct these dynamics, I shift focus to the legislative sphere, particularly voting patterns on immigration bills.

6.4 Voting on Immigration Bills

The voting behavior of MPs is of paramount interest as it manifests tangible action beyond mere participation in discussions about immigration. However, the dynamics of such behaviors can be influenced by intraparty controls. As illustrated by Slapin and Kirkland (2020), incidences of rebellion within UK parties are relatively rare. In Table 4, I present the impact of immigration on MPs' voting tendencies regarding pro- and anti-immigrant amendments to the bills.

A noteworthy finding is that a 1 standard deviation surge in enfranchised immigration enhances the likelihood of MPs amending bills to tighten future immigration rules by 12.3 percentage points (column 4). Furthermore, the propensity of MPs to vote against pro-immigrant amendments—effectively preserving the bill's status quo—increases by 9.5 percentage points, with a similar 1 standard deviation uptick in enfranchised immigration.[20] These results suggest that incumbents cater to the preferences of enfranchised immigrants while concurrently limiting prospective immigration. At the same time, a 1 standard deviation increase in disenfranchised immigration makes MPs 14.1 percentage points more likely to vote for amendments favorable to immigrants and 12.6 percentage points less likely to vote against immigrant interests (column 4). However, this result remains statistically insignificant. Overall, the magnitudes observed indicate that these immigration patterns substantially influence the UK's immigration policies.[21]

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[19] Immigrants need UK nationality to contest for a seat in Parliament. Also, the majority of the ethnic-minority MP in Parliament are mostly second- or third-generation immigrants.

[20] In Appendix Table C3, I provide evidence that my main results are robust to excluding speeches with words related to future immigrants.

[21] Overall, except for a few bills at the start of the period, most immigration bills did not target any particular nationality.

Table 4: Effect on Voting on Immigration Bills

	Δ Voting on Immigration Bills			
	Amend Pro Immigration		Amend Anti Immigration	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Enfranchised	-0.080**	-0.095***	0.082*	0.123***
Immigration	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Disenfranchised	0.146**	0.141**	-0.156**	-0.126
Immigration	(0.059)	(0.062)	(0.071)	(0.081)
Mean DV (in levels)	0.524	0.524	0.459	0.459
KP F Stat	22.39	26.27	22.1	25.65
F Stat (Enf)	47.63	56.71	47.45	56.92
F Stat (DisEnf)	54.19	58.38	52.96	57.97
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls		Yes		Yes
Observations	5740	5740	5500	5500

Notes: This table provides 2SLS estimates across 192 constituencies over 30 years, examining voting on immigration bills in the UK parliament. Columns 1-2 focus on pro-immigrant or status quo amendments, while Columns 3-4 cover anti-immigrant or status quo amendments. Immigration values are based on foreign-born populations from either enfranchised or disenfranchised countries relative to the baseline constituency and are instrumented via the shift-share method (detailed in Section 5.1). KP F stat refers to the Kleibergen-Paap F-stat for the joint significance of the two instruments in the first-stage regression. F-stat (Enf) and F-stat (DisEnf) indicate the Sanderson-Windmeijer partial F-stat for each instrument. Robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. *Data Source:* Voting on bills from the UK Parliament Hansard, $1972 - 2011$.

The opposition to immigration from the MPs with higher enfranchised immigration may be due to a preference for existing enfranchised immigrants to close the door to future immigrants. At the same time, an increase in the vote share for alternative parties reflects increased resistance from natives, accompanied by a higher cultural distance between enfranchised immigrants and the native population. Such policy shifts also serve as a tactical move by incumbents to placate constituents harboring anti-immigration sentiments, often forming the majority. On the other hand, incumbents discern no palpable electoral gains from disenfranchised immigrants, but the analysis period from the 1990s to 2011 saw an integration of the UK with the European Union. Thus, supporting immigration could be seen as fostering stronger economic ties. Below, I summarize several pieces of evidence supporting these arguments.

First, using data from the European Social Survey, I find that existing immigrants (from both groups), when juxtaposed with natives, are considerably more receptive toward incoming immigrants (Appendix Table A17). Remarkably, this openness persists even among immigrants who have acquired UK citizenship. Second, in electoral territories marked by heightened competition (narrower victory margins), the significance of both immigrant and native votes becomes even more pronounced. Here, incumbents tread with caution, seeming less inclined to represent enfranchised immigrants when the margins are thin and similarly abstaining from

proposing restrictions on future immigration (Appendix Table A18). Yet, when their positions are more secure, owing to wider win margins, they appear more responsive to the inclinations of both enfranchised immigrants and natives.

Third, incumbents tend to resonate more favorably toward enfranchised immigrants in constituencies where the Labour Party enjoys substantial support. This pro-immigration sentiment seems to be bolstered by a voter base that aligns with such views (Appendix Table A19). However, the political landscape remains fluid. With the Labour Party's vote share ebbing in some regions, MPs lean toward more restrictive immigration policies, mirroring the desires of the native majority (column 6). A similar and opposite pattern is also visible for the constituencies with higher Conservative Party vote shares (Appendix Table A20).

In summary, enfranchisement might be a conduit for the political integration of immigrants, evoking favorable reactions from incumbents. However, immigrants have limited electoral weight, and incumbents respond to enfranchised immigrants only when it is not costly to do so, compensating by restricting future immigration. The following subsection strives to distinguish the two immigrant groups and elucidates why politicians might be more attuned to enfranchised immigrants.

6.5   Enfranchised versus Disenfranchised Immigrants

I begin with an examination of first-generation immigrants' sociodemographic characteristics using the European Social Survey, comparing enfranchised and disenfranchised groups. The balance statistics, including means for both groups and p values of the outcome variable's regression, are presented in Table A21, along with adjustments for potential sampling errors and nonresponse bias. Approximately 53 percent of the surveyed foreign-born participants are enfranchised, with noticeable differences in age and cohabitation status between the two groups but similarities in education, labor force participation, and life satisfaction. Contrary to expectations, enfranchised immigrants do not exhibit greater political enthusiasm or news engagement, and both groups show similar levels of democratic contentment and trust in the UK's institutions. However, enfranchised immigrants display slightly more confidence in political participation (Appendix Figure A4). Moving forward, the next sub-section explores why politicians might favor enfranchised immigrants, considering constitutional obligations and ethical considerations.

6.6   Political Engagement of Immigrants

I use the European Social Survey to investigate sociopolitical activities among immigrants in the UK, focusing on actions such as contacting officials, working in political groups, displaying campaign materials, signing petitions, participating in demonstrations, and boycotting products. Enfranchised immigrants show a significantly higher likelihood of engaging in sociopolitical activities, particularly in signing petitions (Appendix Table A22).

I also explore the influence of immigrants' democratic backgrounds, finding that those from stronger democracies exhibit increased political and civil engagement after arriving in the UK. Further, enfranchised noncitizens are more inclined to sign petitions, but this gap narrows upon acquiring UK citizenship. In addition, I find that up to 10 years since arrival, only 32 percent of the immigrants have UK citizenship, thus providing more confidence that political engagement is due to enfranchisement rather than to citizenship.

The analysis extends to electoral involvement, showing that enfranchised immigrants with UK citizenship align closely with native voting patterns, while disenfranchised immigrants participate less (Appendix Table A23). These findings are paralleled by similar research in Norway and France, emphasizing the role of early access to political institutions and voter registration processes in fostering immigrant political participation (Braconnier et al., 2017; Ferwerda et al., 2020; Bratsberg et al., 2021).

Table 5: Effect Across Types of Parliament Speeches

	Δ Speech Words per day (1)	Δ Share of Parliament Days			
		All Speeches (2)	Immigrant Speeches (3)	Petitions + Direct Questions + Private Member Bills (4)	Other References (5)
Enfranchised Immigration	-42.752 (76.837)	-0.003 (0.016)	0.014** (0.006)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.011** (0.006)
Disenfranchised Immigration	124.884 (122.768)	-0.006 (0.020)	-0.023*** (0.008)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.018*** (0.007)
Mean DV (in levels)	2207.292	0.527	0.078	0.007	0.070
KP F Stat	22.16	26.3	26.3	26.3	26.3
F Stat (Enf)	52.15	56.73	56.73	56.73	56.73
F Stat (DisEnf)	70.51	58.44	58.44	58.44	58.44
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5091	5760	5760	5760	5760

Notes: This table uses 2SLS to estimate the impact of enfranchised versus disenfranchised immigration on parliamentary speech types. Column 1 shows changes in total words about immigrants per parliament day. Column 2 represents the share of days an MP speaks on any topic. Column 3 denotes days an MP speaks about immigrants. Columns 4 and 5 further dissect Column 3 into speeches on petitions, direct questions, and private member bills (Column 4) and other references (Column 5). The control variables include party vote shares, the stock of immigrants, the ethnic identity of MPs, and immigrants' observable characteristics. Immigration values are based on foreign-born populations from either enfranchised or disenfranchised countries relative to the baseline constituency and are instrumented via the shift-share method (detailed in Section 5.1). KP F stat refers to the Kleibergen-Paap F-stat for instrument significance in initial regression stages. F-stat (Enf) and F-stat (DisEnf) indicate the Sanderson-Windmeijer partial F-stat for each instrument in separate regressions. Robust standard errors clustered at the constituency level are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. *Data Source:* Text of Speech from the UK Parliament Hansard, $1972 - 2011$.

6.7   From Political Inclusion to Parliament Discussions

The survey evidence might carry a social desirability bias, but the data underscore the enhanced political involvement of enfranchised immigrants due to their inclusion. In this subsection, I study whether MPs react to immigrant political engagement by examining parliament speech through 2SLS estimation. The focus is on whether MPs, under immigrant political engagement, allocate more parliamentary time to petitions, member bills, and ministerial queries that mention them. Changes in this time distribution would signify direct influence from political engagement.

Table 5 presents the findings. Columns 1 and 2 indicate no shifts in the extensive margins of parliamentary speeches, neither in total words per session (column 1) nor in the yearly frequency of MP participation

(column 2).[22] Columns 3–5 present changes in the intensive margin. Column 3 echoes column 2 of Table 2, detailing the effect of enfranchisement on *Discussions*.

Columns 4 and 5 then dissect these changes further: column 4 tackles time dedicated to petitions, direct questions, and private member bills, while column 5 explores other immigrant-related discussions. Column 4 verifies that incumbents indeed respond to enfranchised immigrants' active political presence, as seen in a notable 43 percent spike in parliamentary debates. If immigrant political activity indeed prompts incumbent reactions, it stands to reason that heightened engagement leads to more pronounced responses. This hypothesis gains traction when considering heterogeneity by immigrants from strong versus weak democracies (Appendix Table A24, columns 2 and 4). At the same time, there is no such effect on MPs' voting behavior, which predominantly caters to natives' preferences.

7 Conclusion

In an era marked by significant global demographic shifts due to immigration, the challenge of political representation for these new populations takes center stage. This study, set against the backdrop of the UK and its unique enfranchisement practices, examines how the political integration of immigrants reshapes the nation's political landscape over three decades. The results underscore that enfranchisement amplifies immigrants' political engagement and prompts incumbents to address immigrant issues more frequently and positively. Yet, the politicians' voting patterns often resonate more with the majority (natives) sentiments to curb further immigration.

This study, at its core, shows that immigrant enfranchisement is both a matter of democratic representation and an influence on the political tenor of host nations. Though deeply rooted in the UK's sociopolitical fabric, it offers invaluable insights into broader global contexts. As the world grapples with evolving migration patterns, some countries such as the United States, Sweden, and Switzerland are exploring the idea of local-level enfranchisement of foreign-born noncitizens. The findings here not only shed light on the potential outcomes of such policy moves but also emphasize the inherent complexities of integrating and politically including immigrants in the democratic processes.

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[22] There is also no perceptible shift in the overall speech distribution related to immigrants across the group of words (Figure A5).

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A Appendix

A.1 Appendix Tables and Figures

Table A1: Enfranchised Countries by Region

Africa	Asia	Caribbean and Americas	Europe	Pacific
Africa	Bangladesh	Antigua and Barbuda	Cyprus	Australia
Botswana	Brunei Darussalam	Bahamas, The	Malta	Fiji
Cameroon	India	Barbados	Irish Republic	Kiribati
Gambia, The	Malaysia	Belize		Nauru
Ghana	Maldives	Canada		New Zealand
Kenya	Pakistan	Dominica		Papua New Guinea
Kingdom of Eswatini	Singapore	Grenada		Samoa
Lesotho	Sri Lanka	Guyana		Solomon Islands
Malawi		Jamaica		Tonga
Mauritius		Saint Lucia		Tuvalu
Mozambique		St Kitts and Nevis		Vanuatu
Namibia		St Vincent and		
Nigeria		The Grenadines		
Rwanda		Trinidad and Tobago		
Seychelles				
Sierra Leone				
South Africa				
Uganda				
United Republic of Tanzania				
Zambia				

Notes: The table provides the countries which have a right-to-vote in the UK in my analysis period. The voting rights are conditional on the membership to the Commonwealth of Nations; the membership has changed slightly over time, the details are provided in Section 3. *Data Source:* https://www.gov.uk/register-to-vote and https://thecommonwealth.org/.

Figure A1: Constituency Boundary Changes (Warwickshire County)

(a) North Wawickshire

(b) Nuneaton

(c) Rugby

(d) Rugby and Kenilworth

(e) Kenilworth and Southam

(f) Stratford-Upon-Avon

(g) Warwick and Leamington

Notes: The figure shows changes in the parliamentary constituency boundaries for Warwickshire County by the Delimitation Commission in 1983 and 2010. As there were substantial changes to the boundaries, I combine all constituencies to create a parent unit that has consistent boundaries between the Census of 1971 and 2011.
Data Source: Delimitation Commission Reports of 1974, 1983, 1997, and 2010.

Figure A2: Constituency Boundary Changes (Somerset County)

(a) Somerton and Frome

(b) Yeovil

(c) Bridgwater

(d) Taunton

(e) Bridgwater and West Somerset

(f) Taunton Deane

(g) Wells

Notes: The figure shows changes in the parliamentary constituency boundaries for Somerset County by the Delimitation Commission in 1983 and 2010. Somerton and Frome constituency (Figure [a]) was created in 1983 from Yeovil constituency (Figure [b]). I combine both to create a parent unit that is stable between Census 1971 and 2011. The 2010 Delimitation Commission altered the boundaries for the Bridgwater constituency (Figure [c]) and Taunton constituency (Figure [d]) to create the Bridgwater and West Somerset constituency (Figure [e]) and Taunton Deane constituency (Figure [f]). I combine these four constituencies to create a parent unit that is stable between Census 1971 and 2011. The boundaries for the Wells constituency remained unchanged and remains a stable constituency unit.
Data Source: Delimitation Commission Reports of 1974, 1983, 1997, and 2010.

Figure A3: Parliament debates over time

Notes: The figure plots the outcome variable "Discussions", i.e. the share of parliament days related to debates on EU, immigrants, LGBTQ, NHS, and Tax.
Data Source: Text of Speech from the UK Parliament Hansard, 1972 − 2011.

Figure A4: Political Attitudes across Immigrant groups

Notes: The figure plots the coefficient and 95% confidence interval on the indicator variable for an immigrant from the enfranchised group. The y-axis shows standardized outcome variables in the regression. Post-stratification and population weights are applied.
Data Source: The European Social Survey, Waves 1 to 9.

Table A2: Mapping of Census Groups Across Years

Census 1981	Census 1991	Census 2001	Census 2011
Old Commonwealth (Australia, New Zealand, Canada)	Old Commonwealth	Australia + New Zealand + Canada	Antarctica and Oceania (Australasia) + Americas and the Caribbean (Other North America)
East Africa and Africa Remainder	East Africa and Africa Remainder	Nigeria + Kenya + South Africa + Sierra Leone	Nigeria + Kenya + South Africa + Ghana
India	India	India	India
Pakistan	Pakistan	Pakistan	Pakistan
Bangladesh	Bangladesh	Bangladesh	Bangladesh
Caribbean	Caribbean	Jamaica + Other Caribbean and West Indies	Jamaica + Americas and the Caribbean (Other Caribbean)
New Other Commonwealth	New Other Commonwealth + South East Asia + Cyprus	Sri Lanka + Malaysia + Singapore + Other Far East + Cyprus	Sri Lanka + Other South East Asia + Other EU Accession Countries
Irish Republic	Irish Republic	Republic of Ireland	Europe (Ireland)
Europe	Other European Community + Other Europe	Other Western Europe + Eastern Europe - Turkey - Baltic States - USSR - Eastern Europe	France + Germany + Italy + Other EU member countries by March 2001 + Portugal + Spain + Lithuania + Poland + Romania
Rest of the World	Rest of the World	Total - UK - Commonwealth - Europe	Total - UK - Commonwealth - Europe

Notes: The table provides a mapping of the country groups in the Census 1981 with the corresponding parts in the Census 1991, 2001 and 2011.

Table A3: Making a Stable Constituency Panel (Example: Warwickshire County)

County	Stable Constituency	Constituency	Created In	Created From	Abolished In	Replaced By
Warwickshire	Warwickshire	Aylesbury	1885		*ongoing*	
Warwickshire	Warwickshire	Warwick and Leamington	1885		*ongoing*	
Warwickshire	Warwickshire	Nuneaton	1885		*ongoing*	
Warwickshire	Warwickshire	Stratford-Upon-Avon	1950		*ongoing*	
Warwickshire	Warwickshire	Warwickshire North	1983	Nuneaton	*ongoing*	
Warwickshire	Warwickshire	Rugby and Kenilworth	1983	Rugby + Warwick and Leamington	2010	Rugby + Kenilworth and Southam
Warwickshire	Warwickshire	Rugby	2010	Rugby and Kenilworth	*ongoing*	
Warwickshire	Warwickshire	Kenilworth and Southam	2010	Rugby and Kenilworth + Warwick and Leamington Stratford-Upon-Avon	*ongoing*	

Notes: The table shows changes in the constituencies within the Warwickshire County between the Census 1971 and 2011. Data Source: Delimitation Commission Reports: 1974, 1983, 1997 and 2010.

Table A4: Making a Stable Constituency Panel (Example: Somerset County)

County	Stable Constituency	Constituency	Created In	Created From	Abolished In	Replaced By
Somerset	Wells	Wells	1885		*ongoing*	
Somerset	Somerset East	Yeovil	1918		*ongoing*	
Somerset	Somerset East	Somerton and Frome	1983	Yeovil	*ongoing*	
Somerset	Somerset West	Bridgwater	1885		2010	Bridgwater and West Somerset
Somerset	Somerset West	Taunton	1918		2010	Taunton Deane
Somerset	Somerset West	Taunton Deane	2010	Taunton	*ongoing*	
Somerset	Somerset West	Bridgwater and West Somerset	2010	Bridgwater + Taunton	*ongoing*	

Notes: The table shows changes in the constituencies within the Somerset County between the Census 1971 and 2011. *Data Source:* Delimitation Commission Reports: 1974, 1983, 1997 and 2010.

Figure A5: Immigrant Speeches across Word Groups

Notes: The figure shows the distribution of speeches for immigrants across the word groups over the years. *Data Source:* Text of Speech from the UK Parliament Hansard, $1972 - 2011$.

Table A5: Parliament Speech Mapping

Date: DD/MM/YYY				
Broad Topic	Sub Topic	Speaker	Speech	Unique Speech Identifier
ABC	abc	S1	blahblah1	S1_ABC_abc_date
ABC	abc	S2	blahblah2	S2_ABC_abc_date
ABC	abc	S3	blahblah3	S3_ABC_abc_date
ABC	abc	S1	blahblah4	S1_ABC_abc_date
ABC	abc	S2	blahblah5	S2_ABC_abc_date
XYZ	xyz	S1	blahblah6	S1_XYZ_xyz_date
XYZ	xyz	S4	blahblah7	S4_XYZ_xyz_date
XYZ	xyz	S1	blahblah8	S1_XYZ_xyz_date
XYZ	def	S2	blahblah9	S2_XYZ_def_date
XYZ	def	S5	blahblah10	S5_XYZ_def_date

Notes: This table takes a dummy example to illustrate how a single speech for each MP is identified using parliament deliberations. On a given day, MPs deliberate on various topics. The raw data provides information on Broad Topic and Sub Topic. Multiple speeches of a single MP under a broad topic and sub topic are collapsed into a single speech with a unique identifier.

Table A6: Mapping: Parliament Period, General Elections and Census Data

Date: From	Date: To	Parliament	General Election Year	Census Year
1972-01-01	1974-02-27	45th	1970	1981
1974-02-28	1974-10-09	46th	Feb 1974	1981
1974-10-10	1979-05-02	47th	Oct 1974	1981
1979-05-03	1981-12-31	48th	1979	1981
1982-01-01	1983-06-08	48th	1979	1991
1983-06-09	1987-06-10	49th	1983	1991
1987-06-11	1991-12-31	50th	1987	1991
1992-01-01	1992-04-08	50th	1987	2001
1992-04-09	1997-04-30	51st	1992	2001
1997-05-01	2001-06-06	52nd	1997	2001
2001-06-07	2001-12-31	53rd	2001	2001
2002-01-01	2005-05-04	53rd	2001	2011
2005-05-05	2010-05-05	54th	2005	2011
2010-05-06	2011-12-31	55th	2010	2011

Notes: The table provides a mapping of the parliament dates to the general election years and the census years.

Table A7: Examples of Hansard Parliament Data

8th June 1976 > Standards of Literacy and Numeracy by Pupils

Mr Skeet (Conservative) —"...*In Bedford we have a very large immigrant population. I pay tribute to the work of the local education authority, which has done a remarkable job in ensuring that the children are ready to receive education. It does so by giving them special language courses...*"

28th June 1982 > Immigration Regulations

Mr Ivor Stanbrook (Conservative) — "... *we all know that the immigrant community is already so large and gives us so many problems of social friction and racial tension ... that is why we do not want to increase the number of immigrants coming in. That is why we all talk in terms of a strict control over immigration...*"

21st February 1996 > Asylum & Immigration Bill > Restrictions on Employment

Mr Jacques Arnold — "...*Is my hon. Friend aware that the clause is extremely welcome in my Sikh community in Gravesend? For far too many years, my law-abiding Sikh constituents who work in the construction trade and in market gardening have been fed up with their wage rates being undercut by illegal immigrants...*"

15th July 1996 > Asylum & Immigration Bill

Mr Peter Lilley — "*The procedures for claiming asylum were set up to help the small number of people who escape tyrannous regimes, but the rules have been exploited by more and more economic migrants using them to circumvent immigration controls ... The easy availability of social security benefits has been exploited by an ever-rising number of asylum seekers—more than 90 per cent of whom turn out not to be genuine.*"

7th December 2000 > Health and Social Security

Ms Harriet Harman — "...*the immigrants from the different African countries who come to Peckham believe in work. For them, it is a matter of principle — morality, almost — that they work in the community that they have joined .... The stereotype is that immigrants are scroungers, leeching off the welfare state, yet the truth is that much of our welfare state in south London would simply not function without the new African immigrants.*"

16th July 2001 > Punjabi Community

Ms Angela Eagle (Labour) — "...*The Government welcome the positive contributions made by the Hindu, Muslim and Sikh members of the Punjabi community in Britain, and we all share the vision of a society free from prejudice in which differences between religions and ethnic communities are not only respected and valued, but celebrated and promoted...*"

1st November 2010 > Home Department > Immigration System

Mr Mark Spencer (Conservative) — "*The Minister will be aware that companies such as Rolls-Royce, in my constituency, require highly skilled staff from outside the EU. What can be done to ensure that those companies have access to those highly skilled staff while also ensuring that the immigrants coming in have the right skills?*"

Notes: This table provides some snippets of the UK parliament speeches. Each speech contains a date, broad topic and/or the sub topic, and name of the speaker. The party affiliation of the speaker has been added in the brackets. The words capturing the speeches for immigrants and constituency are highlighted in grey colour.

Table A8: Keywords used to extract Parliament Speeches

		Grouping of Words			
Immigrants	Visa and Nationality	Enfranchised Countries	Disenfranchised Countries	Refugees	Constituency
immigrant*	ancestry	commonwealth	EU citizen*	asylum	constituen*
foreigner*	citizen*	windrush	polish*	refugee*	my electorate*
alien*	nationalit*	bangladesh*	bulgaria*	deport*	precint*
migra*	naturalis*	pakistan*	romania*	repatriat*	my county
legal entrant	freedom of movement	india*	france*	exile*	my voter*
illegal entrant	free movement of people	nigeria*	french*	detention*	my citizenry
minorit*	language test	kenya*	german*	extradit*	my district*
gypsy	points of entry	south africa*	ital*		my ward*
traveller	UK border	jamaica*	spain*		my resident*
ethnic*	work permit	uganda*	portugal*		local authorit*
race*	single entry	malta*	holland*		where i was born
racial*	multiple entry	cyprus*	netherland*		where i live
	visa	australia*	sweden*		where i grew up
		new zealand*	finland*		
		canada*	greece*		
		ireland*	turkish*		
		irish*	turkey*		
		hindu*	america*		
		sikh*	china		
		temple*	chinese		
		priest*			

Notes: This table provides a detailed glossary of all words used to extract immigrant speeches using words commonly used in the literature to extract parliament questions about immigrants (Saalfeld, 2011; Geese et al., 2015; Slapin and Kirkland, 2020). The words are grouped under broad headers such as Immigrants, Visa & Nationality, Enfranchised countries, Disenfranchised countries and Refugees. The words used to refer to individual constituency is in the last column.

Table A9: Immigration Bills in the UK Parliament

Bill/Act	Summary	Specific Nationalities
Immigration Bill (Act 1971)	Immigration control extended to all nationalities and right of abode retained for UK citizens and some Commonwealth citizens	Commonwealth countries, colonies and former colonies
Race Relations Act 1976	(a) Improved definition of racial discrimination; (b) creation of the Commission for Racial Equality	N/A
British Nationality Act 1981	No automatic citizenship by birth on British soil anymore	N/A
British Nationality Act 1981	Transition period for naturalisation of specific nationalities	Commonwealth countries, colonies and former colonies
Immigration (Carriers' Liability) Bill (Act 1987)	Carriers made responsible for checking documentation of traveller	N/A
Immigration Bill (Act 1988)	Stricter requirements for family reunification of commonwealth citizens	Commonwealth countries, colonies and former colonies
Immigration Bill (Act 1988)	Makes overstaying an offence and reintroduction of probationary year for relatives of UK citizens	N/A
Immigration Bill (Act 1988)	EU nationals need no leave to enter and remain anymore	EU Member states at that time
Asylum And Immigration Appeals Bill (Act 1993)	(a) UK asylum definition adjusted to Geneva Convention (b) Reduction of benefit entitlements for asylum seekers; (c) Fingerprinting of asylum applicants introduced; (d) Fast track appeal procedures and time limits introduced; (e) Detention of asylum seekers	N/A
Asylum And Immigration Bill (Act 1996)	(a) Extension of penalties for illegal entry to those seeking leave to enter; (b) Reduction of benefit entitlements for certain asylum seekers; (c) Introduction of employer sanctions; (d) Extended rights for searching and arresting immigration offenders	N/A

Table A10: Immigration Bills in the UK Parliament (Continued)

Bill/Act	Summary	Specific Nationalities
Immigration And Asylum Bill (Act 1999)	(a) new welfare support system for asylum seekers; (b) more detention powers and capacities; (c) carrier sanctions extended to private vehicles; (d) more staff abroad to curb number of forged travel IDs used; (e) immigration for marriage restricted	N/A
Nationality, Immigration And Asylum Bill (Act 2002)	(a) creation of induction, accommodation and removal centres for asylum seekers; (b) more technology and border control, especially towards France; (c) introduction of citizenship test and ceremony (implemented in 2005); (d) expulsion of rejected asylum seekers from safe countries possible; (e) detention of asylum seekers extended	N/A
Asylum And Immigration (Treatment Of Claimants, Etc) Bill (Act 2004)	(a) employer sanctions increased; (b) increased technology to trace asylum seekers; (c) sanctions for entering on invalid travel documents; (d) refugee support limited; (e) merger of appeal bodies and creation of asylum and immigration tribunal	N/A
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008	(a) immigration officers given detention, search and seizure power; (b) compulsory biometric identity documents (implemented in 2008); (c) automatic deportation of certain foreign criminals; (d) higher residency conditions for immigrants with limited leave to remain	N/A
Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009	(a) new requirements for students to be sponsored; (b) fingerprinting of foreign criminals allowed; (c) introduction of probationary citizenship period before naturalisation; (d) access to benefits restricted during probationary citizenship	N/A

Notes: The table provides a list of all acts discussed in the UK parliament related to immigration during my time-period of study along with a short description of bills including a one line summary and target groups (including specific nationalities).

Table A11: First Stage Results

	Immigration	
	(1) Enfranchised	(2) Disenfranchised
Z Enfranchised Immigration	0.618*** (0.091)	0.284*** (0.080)
Z Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.424*** (0.112)	0.225** (0.091)
Sanderson-Windmeijer F statistic	56.73	58.44
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic		26.30
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic p-value		0.0001
Stock-Yogo (2005) weak ID F test critical values:		
at 10% maximal IV size		19.93
at 15% maximal IV size		11.59
Region FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
# Clusters	192	192
Observations	5760	5760

Notes: The table provides the relationship between the fraction of immigrants and the instrument, for enfranchised and disenfranchised groups from two separate first-stage regressions.

Table A12: Robustness to Missing Valence Scores

	Δ Valence		
	(1) OLS	(2) 2SLS	(3) 2SLS
Enfranchised Immigration	0.072** (0.035)	0.235*** (0.067)	0.205*** (0.059)
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.077* (0.046)	-0.229** (0.089)	-0.223** (0.103)
KP F Stat		22.38	26.3
F Stat (Enf)		47.62	56.73
F Stat (DisEnf)		54.15	58.44
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls			Yes
Observations	5760	5760	5760

Notes: This table presents the robustness of Table 2 Columns 4, 5, and 6 by imputing the valence scores from the last available speech. The valence scores are missing because not all MPs speak about immigrants every year.

Table A13: Dropping Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Ireland

	Immigrants Speeches		Immigration Bills
	Δ Discussions	Δ Valence	Δ Amend Anti
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Enfranchised Immigration	0.015**	0.237***	0.139***
	(0.007)	(0.077)	(0.046)
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.024***	-0.240**	-0.134
	(0.008)	(0.106)	(0.084)
Mean DV (in levels)	0.078		0.459
KP F Stat	25.46	26.43	25.35
F Stat (Enf)	48.52	45.12	48.38
F Stat (DisEnf)	56.21	69.72	55.54
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5760	5091	5500

Notes: This table shows the robustness of the main results to the exclusion of immigrants from Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Ireland from the enfranchised immigration.

Table A14: Effect on Turnout and Party Affiliation of MP

	Δ Share Native Population	Δ Turnout	Δ MP from Party			
			Labour	Conservative	LibDem + Plaid Cymru	Populist + Green + Independent
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Enfranchised Immigration	-0.006	-0.009**	-0.004	0.024	-0.021	0.002
	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.004)
Disenfranchised Immigration	0.004	0.008*	0.038	-0.066**	0.027	0.001
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.003)
Mean DV (in levels)	0.987	0.699	0.466	0.461	0.070	0.002
KP F Stat	21.23	21.23	21.23	21.23	21.23	21.23
F Stat (Enf)	52.48	52.48	52.48	52.48	52.48	52.48
F Stat (DisEnf)	44.56	44.56	44.56	44.56	44.56	44.56
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5760	5760	5760	5760	5760	5760

Notes: This table presents the 2SLS estimates of the enfranchised and the disenfranchised immigration on the changes in the share of native population (Column 1), overall turnout (Column 2) and measures of the member of parliament of the constituencies coming from the Labour party (Column 3), the Conservative party (Column 4), regional parties (Column 5) and other parties (Column 6). As constituencies have been aggregated to their parent units by a weighted average of the electorate size, the party affiliation in Columns 3 to 6 is not a dummy variable. The control variables include the stock of immigrants, the ethnic–minority identity of MPs, and the observable characteristics of the immigrants.

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Table A15: Effect on Descriptive Representation

	Δ Descriptive Representation		
	(1) Both	(2) Enfranchised	(3) Disenfranchised
Enfranchised Immigration	0.055***	0.048***	0.007
	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.007)
Disenfranchised Immigration	0.021	0.036*	-0.015
	(0.027)	(0.018)	(0.017)
Mean DV	0.030	0.018	0.011
KP F Stat	27.8	27.8	27.8
F Stat (Enf)	55.01	55.01	55.01
F Stat (DisEnf)	60.6	60.6	60.6
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5376	5376	5376

Notes: This table presents the 2SLS estimates of the enfranchised and the disenfranchised immigration on the descriptive representation of ethnic-minority MPs in the parliament (Columns 1 to 3). Column 1 is split up between ethnic-minority MPs from the enfranchised group of countries (Column 2) and the disenfranchised group of countries (Column 3). The control variables include vote shares of parties in the constituency, stock of immigrants, and observable characteristics of the immigrants.

Table A16: Heterogeneity by Ethnic-Minority MP

	Immigrants Speeches				Immigration Bills	
	Δ Discussions		Δ Valence		Δ Amend Anti	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Enfranchised Immigration	0.012**	0.015**	0.224***	0.247***	0.082*	0.066
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.072)	(0.074)	(0.043)	(0.044)
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.015**	-0.014**	-0.226**	-0.221**	-0.156**	-0.165**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.071)	(0.071)
Enfranchised Immigration × Ethnic-Minority MP		-0.019**		-0.166		0.067
		(0.007)		(0.166)		(0.063)
Ethnic-Minority MP		0.019**		0.161		0.099
		(0.008)		(0.204)		(0.128)
Mean DV (in levels)	0.078	0.078			0.459	0.459
KP F Stat	22.38	15	22.86	15.33	22.1	14.84
F Stat (Enf)	47.62	44.33	43.31	42.5	47.45	44.33
F Stat (DisEnf)	54.15	56.35	64.38	71.86	52.96	55.22
F Stat (... × Ethnic-Minority MP)		386.65		316.62		387.77
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5760	5760	5091	5091	5500	5500

Notes: This table shows heterogeneity of Enfranchised Immigration by presence of ethnic-minority MP in that constituency. As constituencies have been aggregated to their parent units by a weighted average of the electorate size, the ethnic-minority MP is not a dummy variable.

Table A17: Attitude of Immigrants towards Immigration

	EU Unification should go further	Allow more immigrants in the UK from		
		Poor Countries outside Europe	Same Race Ethnicity as the majority	Different Race Ethnicity than the majority
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1 I(Enfranchised Immigrant)	0.289***	0.421***	0.364***	0.406***
	(0.091)	(0.069)	(0.066)	(0.071)
2 I(Enfranchised Immigrant) × I(UK Citizenship)	-0.074	-0.119	-0.171**	-0.121
	(0.102)	(0.080)	(0.076)	(0.080)
3 I(Disenfranchised Immigrant)	0.637***	0.384***	0.395***	0.387***
	(0.072)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.058)
4 I(Disenfranchised Immigrant) × I(UK Citizenship)	-0.347***	-0.106	-0.185**	-0.127*
	(0.099)	(0.076)	(0.079)	(0.077)
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
p-value: Coefficient 1 = 3	0.002	0.723	0.809	0.700
p-value: Coefficient 1 + 2 = 3 + 4	0.378	0.656	0.708	0.830
Observations	12193	17034	17034	17034

Notes: The table presents the attitude of immigrants in the UK towards future immigration using the full dataset to compare enfranchised and disenfranchised immigrants with the native responses. The number of observations in Column 1 is smaller because this question was not asked in the initial rounds of the European Social Survey.

Table A18: Heterogeneity by Win Margin

	Immigrants Speeches				Immigration Bills	
	Δ Discussions		Δ Valence		Δ Amend Anti	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Enfranchised Immigration	0.012**	0.003	0.224***	0.084	0.082*	-0.017
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.072)	(0.092)	(0.043)	(0.044)
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.015**	-0.012*	-0.226**	-0.157**	-0.156**	-0.110*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.089)	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.056)
Enfranchised Immigration × Win Margin		0.037		0.470		0.359**
		(0.027)		(0.309)		(0.176)
Win Margin		0.033**		1.437***		0.716***
		(0.017)		(0.269)		(0.108)
Mean DV (in levels)	0.078	0.078			0.459	0.459
KP F Stat	22.38	16.06	22.86	14.81	22.1	15.93
F Stat (Enf)	47.62	101.78	43.31	95.79	47.45	100.44
F Stat (DisEnf)	54.15	110.96	64.38	146.93	52.96	111.8
F Stat (... × Win Margin)		62.64		56.86		60.93
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5760	5760	5091	5091	5500	5500

Notes: This table shows heterogeneity of Enfranchised Immigration by the win margin in the constituency.

Table A19: Differences Across Constituencies by Labour Vote Share

| | Immigrants Speeches | | | | Immigration Bills | |
| | Δ Discussions | | Δ Valence | | Δ Amend Anti | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Enfranchised Immigration	0.012**	-0.016	0.224***	-0.281*	0.082*	-0.353***
	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.072)	(0.165)	(0.043)	(0.100)
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.015**	-0.013**	-0.226**	-0.199***	-0.156**	-0.126**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.089)	(0.068)	(0.071)	(0.062)
Enfranchised Immigration ×		0.053**		0.905***		0.906***
Vote Share Labour		(0.026)		(0.318)		(0.224)
Vote Share Labour		0.011		0.684***		-0.691***
		(0.015)		(0.223)		(0.135)
Mean DV (in levels)	0.078	0.078			0.459	0.459
KP F Stat	22.38	25.33	22.86	24.56	22.1	25.53
F Stat (Enf)	47.62	117.5	43.31	106.83	47.45	115.28
F Stat (DisEnf)	54.15	93.02	64.38	94.09	52.96	93.04
F Stat (... × Vote Share ...)		88.13		78.40		85.92
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5760	5760	5091	5091	5500	5500

Notes: This table shows heterogeneity of Enfranchised Immigration by vote share for labour party.

Table A20: Differences Across Constituencies by Conservative Vote Share

	Immigrants Speeches				Immigration Bills	
	Δ Discussions		Δ Valence		Δ Amend Anti	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Enfranchised Immigration	0.012**	0.025**	0.224***	0.441***	0.082*	0.563***
	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.072)	(0.149)	(0.043)	(0.121)
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.015**	-0.014**	-0.226**	-0.225***	-0.156**	-0.145**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.089)	(0.079)	(0.071)	(0.062)
Enfranchised Immigration ×		-0.050		-0.909**		-1.822***
Vote Share Conservative		(0.034)		(0.391)		(0.316)
Vote Share Conservative		-0.003		-0.564*		0.505**
		(0.021)		(0.324)		(0.235)
Mean DV (in levels)	0.078	0.078			0.459	0.459
KP F Stat	22.38	25.48	22.86	8.07	22.1	10.13
F Stat (Enf)	47.62	40.45	43.31	33.33	47.45	39.65
F Stat (DisEnf)	54.15	105.47	64.38	126.78	52.96	105.19
F Stat (... × Vote Share ...)		65.12		57.7		65.7
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5760	5760	5091	5091	5500	5500

Notes: This table shows heterogeneity of Enfranchised Immigration by vote share for conservative party.

Table A21: Balance Statistics: Immigrants in the UK

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Variable	Mean (DisEnf)	Mean (Enf)	p-value	q-value
Age of Respondent	41.8	47.5	0.000	0.001
Gender: Female	0.46	0.44	0.70	0.91
Live with husband/wife/partner	0.54	0.59	0.020	0.12
Years of full-time education completed	14.6	14.1	0.23	0.59
Education Respondent ≤ ISCED 3	0.47	0.52	0.75	0.91
Education Partner ≤ ISCED 3	0.46	0.48	0.61	0.91
Education Father ≤ ISCED 3	0.66	0.68	0.90	0.95
Education Mother ≤ ISCED 3	0.74	0.79	0.084	0.34
Respondent: Paid Work in last 7 days	0.60	0.55	0.29	0.59
Partner: Paid Work in last 7 days	0.37	0.35	0.31	0.59
Job satisfaction [0-10]	7.46	7.50	0.95	0.95
Life satisfaction as a whole [0-10]	7.10	7.09	0.34	0.59
Number of observations			1853	
Share of Enfranchised Respondents			53.16%	

Notes: This table highlights differences in observable characteristics between enfranchised (Enf) and disenfranchised (DisEnf) immigrants. ISCED refers to the International Standard Classification of Education. P-values are derived from a t-test comparing both groups, while q-values adjust these p-values for multiple hypothesis testing using the False Discovery Rate method as per Benjamini and Hochberg (1995). Post-stratification and population weights are applied. *Data Source:* The European Social Survey, Waves 1 to 9.

Table A22: Political Engagement of Immigrants

	I(Signed a Petition)			I(Any Action)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1 I(Enfranchised Immigrant)	0.076***	0.044	0.108***	0.055**	0.017	0.094**
	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.039)	(0.045)
2 I(Enfranchised Immigrant) × I(Democracy Index > Above Median)		0.125**			0.147***	
		(0.049)			(0.054)	
3 I(Democracy Index > Above Median)		0.018			0.019	
		(0.034)			(0.040)	
4 I(Enfranchised Immigrant) × I(UK Citizenship)			-0.092*			-0.097*
			(0.049)			(0.055)
5 I(UK Citizenship)			0.134***			0.123***
			(0.032)			(0.037)
Mean DV (Disenfranchised Immigrant)	0.260	0.260	0.260	0.404	0.404	0.404
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1853	1853	1853	1853	1853	1853
p-value: Coefficient 1 + 2 + 3 = Coefficient 3		0.000			0.000	
p-value: Coefficient 1 + 4 + 5 = Coefficient 5			0.627			0.934

Notes: This table contrasts political engagement between enfranchised and disenfranchised immigrants based on the survey question: "There are different ways of trying to improve things in UK or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months have you … ?". Columns 1-3 focus on the act of signing petitions, while Columns 4-6 consider broader political activities: taken part in a lawful public demonstration; worn or displayed a campaign badge/sticker; worked in a political party, organisation or association; contacted a politician, government or local government official; boycotted certain products; signed a petition. Columns 1 and 4 highlight engagement differences between immigrant types; Columns 2 and 5 analyze the country of origin's democracy index (sourced from Freedom House's combination of political and civil rights scores). Columns 3 and 6 offer insights on engagement concerning UK citizenship status. Controls include education, life satisfaction, and employment. Post-stratification and population weights are applied. Robust standard errors are included in the parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. *Data Source:* The European Social Survey, Waves 1 to 9.

Table A23: Survey Evidence on Voting across Immigrants and Natives

	I(Vote)	I(Vote Party)			
		Labour	Conservative	Populist + Green + Independent	LibDem + Plaid Cymru
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1 I(Enfranchised Immigrant)	-0.229***	0.264***	-0.223***	-0.013	-0.027
	(0.041)	(0.049)	(0.034)	(0.015)	(0.038)
2 I(Enfranchised Immigrant) × I(UK Citizenship)	0.253***	-0.003	0.051	-0.008	-0.040
	(0.045)	(0.053)	(0.039)	(0.017)	(0.041)
3 I(Disenfranchised Immigrant)					
4 I(Disenfranchised Immigrant) × I(UK Citizenship)	-0.143***	0.115***	-0.055	-0.009	-0.050**
	(0.031)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.014)	(0.025)
Mean DV (UK Natives)	0.746	0.365	0.355	0.105	0.174
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Individual Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	16460	11352	11352	11352	11352
p-value: Coefficient 1 + 2 = 4	0.000	0.001	0.003	0.440	0.552

Notes: This table presents the survey evidence on respondents voting in the last general election comparing the enfranchised and disenfranchised immigrants with the natives. Among the respondents who voted, there is additional information on which party did the respondents voted: labour party (Column 2), conservative party (Column 3), regional parties (Column 4) and the other parties (Column 5).

Table A24: Heterogeneity by Democracy Index of Immigration

	Immigrants Speeches				Immigration Bills	
	Δ Discussions		Δ Valence		Δ Amend Anti	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Enfranchised Immigration	0.012**	0.007	0.224***	0.151**	0.082*	0.089**
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.043)	(0.043)
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.015**	-0.016**	-0.226**	-0.243**	-0.156**	-0.167**
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.089)	(0.095)	(0.071)	(0.074)
Enfranchised Immigration ×		0.012**		0.148**		0.029
I(Democracy Index > Median)		(0.006)		(0.066)		(0.042)
I(Democracy Index > Median)		-0.002		-0.031		0.091**
		(0.004)		(0.064)		(0.037)
Mean DV (in levels)	0.078	0.078			0.459	0.459
KP F Stat	22.38	10.35	22.86	8.83	22.1	10.31
F Stat (Enf)	47.62	56.83	43.31	62.86	47.45	57.2
F Stat (DisEnf)	54.15	47.77	64.38	57.11	52.96	49.29
F Stat (... × Democracy Index)		49.44		47.12		49.29
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5760	5760	5091	5091	5500	5500

Notes: This table shows heterogeneity of Enfranchised Immigration by the democracy index of the immigrants. The democracy index is computed as a sum of political rights score and civil rights score available annually for each country from Freedom House. The democracy index for the constituency is computed as a weighted average of the size of immigrants from each country group in the constituency.

A.2   Appendix: Other Surveys

While the European Social Survey provides a representative sample of immigrants in the UK, here I supplement additional evidence using the UK Household Longitudinal Study (2009–2019) and the British Household Panel Survey (1991–2008). I mainly rely on the European Social Survey as in the other two surveys, the country of birth for about a third of the foreign-born respondents is categorized as "other country," which introduces more measurement errors. Table C1 provides a balance statistics test between the share of immigrants from the enfranchised (Enf) and the disenfranchised (DisEnf) group on their observable characteristics. I classify respondents based on their country of birth and focus exclusively on those not born in the UK.

These surveys are not without limitations. For instance, some questions are not consistently posed across different survey periods. Specifically, 33.8 percent of the sample had their country of birth listed as another country. I use ethnicity data for those listed under "other country" to improve the accuracy of my classifications, and I mark the remaining as disenfranchised; therefore, some imprecision remains.

My findings indicate that enfranchised immigrants are, on average, four years older than disenfranchised immigrants. They also have similar gender ratios and are more likely to be married. Both groups show comparable levels in areas like highest educational attainment, work hours, employment rates, driving license ownership, and job satisfaction. Enfranchised immigrants generally arrive in the UK three years earlier than their disenfranchised counterparts and are more likely to face challenges with English proficiency. Overall, despite the data limitations, the findings remain similar to using the European Social Survey.

Table C1: Summary Statistics: UKHLS + BHPS Sample

Variable	(1) Mean (DisEnf)	(2) Mean (Enf)	(3) Standardized difference	(4) Observations
Gender: Female	0.56	0.51	0.096	14,165
Age of respondent	34.02	37.82	0.291	14,144
Marital Status: Married	0.41	0.57	0.291	14,165
Highest Education: Degree or University	0.44	0.44	0.009	8,844
Paid work last week	0.54	0.53	0.032	14,084
No. of hours worked per week	33.86	32.81	0.090	6,570
Job satisfaction	5.18	5.15	0.020	5,449
Respondent has driving licence	0.46	0.48	0.030	13,062
Prefer to move house	0.43	0.40	0.051	12,573
Difficulty speaking english	0.16	0.24	0.199	5,220
Difficulty reading english	0.23	0.28	0.087	5,222
Year arrival to the UK	1999	1996	0.360	14,165

Notes: The table shows the differences between the immigrants from the enfranchised (Enf) and the disenfranchised (DisEnf) group on their observable characteristics. The share of enfranchised immigrants in the overall sample is 52.31%. Column (3) reports the standardized differences between the two groups. The number of observations varies across variables because not all questions were asked in survey years. The non-response rate is only marginal ($< 0.1\%$). *Data Source:* UK Household Level Panel Survey ($2009 - 2019$) and British Household Panel Survey ($1991 - 2008$).

A.3 Appendix: Robustness Checks

In this section, I discuss threats to identification and present several robustness checks to test the strength of the results presented in the paper.

A.3.1 Altering Controls and Outcome Variable

In Table 2, which presents the main results, I introduce all control variables together in the estimation: party vote shares, the stock of immigrants, a dummy for constituencies where ethnic-minority candidates contest elections, and observable characteristics of the immigrants (age, gender, marital status, employment, and educational levels). One potential concern is that if immigration impacts these variables, then some of the changes in the outcome variables might be mediated through them. Table C2 shows that the results are robust to including individual controls one at a time, and the coefficient of enfranchised immigration remains stable across columns.

Another concern might be the words used to extract speeches about immigrants. In Appendix Table C3, I provide evidence that my main results are robust to excluding speeches with words related to ethnicity, race, and refugees; visa and nationality; and those involving discussion of immigration bills (future immigrants). The point estimates across all columns remain almost similar. In addition, the last two columns of Table C3 show that the increase in parliament discussion due to enfranchised immigration is specific to immigrants from enfranchised countries (column 4) and not from immigrants from disenfranchised countries (column 5).

A.3.2 Alternative Estimation Strategy

Next, I examine alternative versions of the estimation strategy to test the robustness of the results (Table C1). I redo the main results by transforming the primary outcome variables in levels, including constituency fixed effects and regional time trends (columns 1 and 2) rather than in 10-year differences. Next, since the explanatory variable changes at each census, while the outcome variable varies each year, in column 3, I show the robustness of the main estimation equation for just three time periods (three census years) by undertaking an analysis in decades.

In column 4, I show the robustness of the results using predicted population shares rather than the 1981 population shares. Finally, to analyze the effect of the share of enfranchised immigration, I use an alternative specification that looks at changes in the main outcome variables on immigration and the share of enfranchised immigration (Table C4). A constituency with 50 percent enfranchised immigrants and 50 percent disenfranchised immigrants, or when the share of enfranchised immigration is 0.5, still shows null results.

A.3.3 Alternative Versions of Instruments

In the main results, I use a leave-one-out version of the shift-share instrument at the constituency level. Here, I present the robustness of the instrumental variable strategy by constructing an alternative version of the instruments (Table C5). Column 1 uses predicted immigrants using the traditional Bartik instrument without the leave-out strategy. In column 2, I predict the share of immigrants using a leave-out version of the

instrument with a larger geographical region (county) to alleviate any concerns that pull factors are correlated across the constituency units (Adao et al., 2019).

As my identification relies on exogenous shocks, I update the migrant networks as new information becomes available in each census (column 3); that is, I increase the number of country groups in the enfranchised and disenfranchised immigration and use new networks to predict immigration. This robustness alleviates any concerns that a smaller number of country groups might be problematic and that 1980s immigrant networks might not be a strong predictor of the immigrant's settlement in the later periods. Following Borusyak et al. (2022), column 4 shows that the transformed instrumental variable regression at the estimated at level of shocks has a numerical equivalence to the shift-share instrumental variable regression (column 3).

A.3.4 Pre-Period Characteristics

In Table C6, I address the concerns that 1981 immigrant settlements and other constituency-specific characteristics are correlated and might have had a time-varying effect on economic and political conditions. In column 1, I augment the baseline specification with the 1981 share of employment by different industries such as agriculture, manufacturing, construction, transport, interacted with year dummies. The results suggest that these controls do not have any effect on my results.

I then test if specific immigrant groups that settled in particular constituencies impacted the economic and political conditions in the future periods; that is, pre-period shares of immigrants were not independent of cross-constituency pull factors systematically related to 1981 settlers' country of origin (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020). I find that including the 1981 population shares from each country group as a control variable, and controlling for initial political conditions, does not affect my point estimates (columns 2 and 3).

In column 4, I include lagged immigrant flows and instrument them with lagged versions of the instrument (Jaeger et al., 2018). The point estimates increase, suggesting that most of the effects are driven by current immigration and are not capturing the effects of previous migration waves. Finally, as a placebo regression, I find no correlation between pre-period changes in the outcome of interest and the change in immigration predicted by the instrument (column 5). Thus, the shocks are randomly assigned and do not affect the outcome variables.

Table C1: Alternative Estimation: in Levels, by Decades and with Predicted Population

	In Levels		By Decades	With Predicted Population
	Discussions			Δ Discussions
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Enfranchised Immigration	0.019**	0.019**	0.012**	0.014**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.033***	-0.036***	-0.015**	-0.023***
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Mean DV (in levels)	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078
KP F Stat	15.6	10.55	22.03	23.45
F Stat (Enf)	34.1	29.78	46.87	55.99
F Stat (DisEnf)	38.97	24.36	53.3	53.35
Constituency FE	Yes	Yes		
Region Time trends		Yes		
Region FE			Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes		Yes
Observations	5760	5760	576	5760

Notes: This table shows the robustness of the estimation strategy by regressing the outcome variables in levels rather than in 10-year differences (Columns 1 to 2). Column 3 shows the robustness of the main estimation equation for just three time periods (3 census years or analysis in decades). Column 4 show robustness using predicted population shares rather than 1981 baseline population shares.

Table C2: Robustness to Individual Controls

	(1) No Controls	(2) Ethnic-Minority MP	(3) Party Vote Shares	(4) Immigrant Stocks	(5) Observable Characteristics	(6) All Controls
				Δ Discussions		
Enfranchised Immigration	0.012**	0.012**	0.012**	0.012**	0.014**	0.014**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.015**	-0.015**	-0.015**	-0.019***	-0.016**	-0.023***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Mean DV (in levels)	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.078
KP F Stat	22.38	22.77	24.89	21.68	24.51	26.3
F Stat (Enf)	47.62	49.95	50.91	47.99	50.35	56.73
F Stat (DisEnf)	54.15	54.64	70.99	48.79	51.81	58.44
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5760	5760	5760	5760	5760	5760

Notes: This table shows the robustness of the results in the Table 2 by introducing the control variables one at a time. Table 2 Column 3 is presented in Panel A and Column 6 is presented in Panel B.

Table C3: Robustness to Selection of Parliament Speeches

	(1) Main Result	(2) (1) - Words of Ethnicity, Race and Refugees	(3) (1) - Words for Future Immigrants	Δ Discussions (4) Words of Enfranchised Countries	(5) Words of Disenfranchised Countries
Enfranchised Immigration	0.014**	0.014**	0.013**	0.010**	0.003
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.002)
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.023***	-0.019***	-0.020***	-0.015***	-0.003
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.003)
Mean DV (in levels)	0.078	0.072	0.068	0.033	0.034
KP F Stat	26.3	26.3	26.3	26.3	26.3
F Stat (Enf)	56.73	56.73	56.73	56.73	56.73
F Stat (DisEnf)	58.44	58.44	58.44	58.44	58.44
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5760	5760	5760	5760	5760

Notes: The table shows the robustness of the main results to the selection of speeches about immigrants in the Hansard.

Table C4: Estimation by Share Enfranchised

	Δ Discussions	
	(1)	(2)
Immigration	-0.009	-0.052**
	(0.007)	(0.021)
Immigration × Share Enfranchised		0.097**
		(0.040)
Share Enfranchised		-0.013
		(0.016)
Mean DV (in levels)	0.078	0.078
KP F Stat	37.95	18.59
F Stat (Imm)		38.6
F Stat (Imm × Share Enfranchised)		39.77
Region FE	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	5760	5760

Notes: This table presents the robustness of the estimation strategy by regressing the immigration interacted with the share of enfranchised immigration.

Table C5: Estimation by Alternative Versions of Instrument

	Δ Discussions			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Traditional	Leave Out County	Base Update	Shock Transformation
Enfranchised Immigration	0.012*	0.017***	0.012*	0.012*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.024***	-0.024***	-0.013**	
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)	
Mean DV (in levels)	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.141
KP F Stat	33.61	19.97	26.76	20.11
F Stat (Enf)	68	59.35	56.45	
F Stat (DisEnf)	74.71	42.75	123.94	
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	
Country Group FE				Yes
Observations	5760	5760	5760	340

Notes: This table shows the robustness of the instrumental variable strategy by constructing an alternative version of the instruments. Column 1 uses predicted immigrants using the traditional Bartik instrument without the leave-out strategy. In Column 2, I predict the share of immigrants using a leave-out version of the instrument with a county (a larger geographical region). Column 3 updates the migrant networks as new information becomes available in each census. Column 4 shows the transformed IV regression at the estimated at level of shocks as suggested by Borusyak et al. (2022) with the updated migrant networks.

Table C6: Robustness to Baseline Economic Characteristics, Baseline Population Shares, Baseline Political Conditions, Past Immigration and the Effect of Outcome on Post-period Immigration

	Δ Discussions				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Enfranchised Immigration	0.012**	0.020**	0.012**	0.020*	
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.012)	
Disenfranchised Immigration	-0.015**	-0.023***	-0.015**	-0.024*	
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.015)	
Enfranchised Immigration$_{t-10}$				-0.044*	
				(0.024)	
Enfranchised Immigration$_{t+10}$					-0.004
					(0.004)
Disenfranchised Immigration$_{t+10}$					-0.009
					(0.007)
Mean DV (in levels)	0.078	0.078	0.078	0.082	0.073
KP F Stat	22.17	21.56	24.96	1.94	12.4
F Stat (Enf)	45.86	55.6	52.94	8.58	8.58
F Stat (DisEnf)	53.92	40.51	66.05	7.94	7.94
Region FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Economic Characteristics	Population Shares	Political Conditions	Past Immigration	
Observations	5760	5760	5760	3840	3840

Notes: This table shows the robustness of the main results to the inclusion of the 1981 economic characteristics measured as the share of the economically active population (Column 1), 1981 population shares from each country group in the constituency (Column 2), 1981 vote shares for Labour party, the Conservative party and the regional parties at the constituency (Column 3) and past immigration; where past immigration is instrumented with past immigration shocks (Column 4). Column 5 shows how the outcome is linked to subsequent changes in immigration predicted by the instrument.